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Bhupinder Singh Anand2 
Classical interpretations of Gödel’s formal reasoning, and of his conclusions, 
implicitly imply that mathematical languages are essentially incomplete, in the 
sense that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical 
language, under any interpretation, is, both, non-algorithmic, and essentially 
unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse, which intends 
to mathematically express, and unambiguously communicate, intuitive concepts 
that correspond to scientific investigations, cannot allow its mathematical 
propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, 
define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of 
classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Gödel’s reasoning, under which any formal 
system of Peano Arithmetic - classically accepted as the foundation of all our 
mathematical languages - is verifiably complete in the above sense. We show how 
some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can, then, be expressed, and 
interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth. 
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Journal NeuroQuantology 2004; 2: 60-100. In particular, page and footnote numbers differ significantly. 
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I Do Gödel’s Theorems limit our ability to mathematically 
express, and communicate, mental concepts? 
I-1 Introduction4 
Classical5 interpretations of Gödel’s formal reasoning and conclusions - in his seminal 
1931 paper, “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
related systems I” [Go31a], in which he introduces his two, famous, “Incompleteness” 
Theorems - suggest that the classical, Tarskian, truth6 of some propositions7 of a formal 
mathematical language8, under an interpretation9, is, both, non-algorithmic10, and 
essentially unverifiable, constructively11. 
                                               
4 We define the notation and terminology used in this essay in the Appendix. 
 
5 For the purposes of this essay, we take the expositions by Hardy [Ha47], Landau [La51], Mendelson 
[Me64], Rudin [Ru53] and Titchmarsh [Ti61] as standard presentations of classical mathematical reasoning 
and conclusions. 
 
6 We use the word “true” both in its familiar, linguistic, sense, and in a mathematically precise sense; the 
appropriate meaning is usually obvious from the context. Mathematically, we follow Mendelson’s 
exposition of the truth of a formal sentence under an interpretation as determined by Tarski’s definitions of 
satisfiability and truth ([Me64], p51). 
 
7 When referring to a formal language, we assume the terms “sentence” and “proposition” are synonymous, 
and that they refer to a well-formed expression of the language that contains no free variables, and which 
translates, under an interpretation, as a proposition in the usual, linguistic, sense. However, the term 
“proposition” is sometimes reserved for “metatheorems”, which are proven statements about the language 
([Me64], footnote on p31-31). 
 
8 By a “formal language” we mean a “formal system” or a “formal theory” as in Mendelson ([Me64], p29). 
 
9 As in this sentence, the word “interpretation” may be used both in its familiar, linguistic, sense, and in a 
mathematically precise sense; the appropriate meaning is usually obvious from the context. 
Mathematically, we follow Mendelson’s definition of “interpretation” ([Me64], §2, p49): 
 
“An interpretation consists of a non-empty set D, called the domain of the interpretation, and an 
assignment to each predicate letter Aj
n of an n-place relation in D, to each function letter fjn of an n-place 
operation in D (i.e., a function from Dn into D), and to each individual constant ai of some fixed element of 
D. Given such an interpretation, variables are thought of as ranging over the set D, and ~, =>, and 
quantifiers are given their usual meaning. (Remember that an n-place relation in D can be thought of as a 
subset of Dn, the set of all n-tuples of elements of D.)” 
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The questions arise: Does this imply, first, that the determination of mathematical truths, 
akin to that of scientific truths, is a process best described as discovery; and, second, do 
Gödel’s Theorems set absolute limits on our ability to mathematically express, and 
communicate, our mental concepts precisely, and verifiably, in general, scientific, 
discourse12? 
Since it is not germane to the issue in these essays, we shall neither divert ourselves with 
an exposition of the novel meta-mathematical, and logical, features of these remarkable 
                                                                                                                                            
We note that the interpreted relation R(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of a formal system P by 
replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical 
symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically well-defined, concept of classical 
mathematics). So the P-formula [(Ax)R(x)] interprets as the sentence (Ax)R(x), and the P-formula 
[~(Ax)R(x)] as the sentence ~(Ax)R(x). 
 
We also note that the meta-assertions “[(Ax)R(x)] is a true sentence under the interpretation M of P”, and 
“(Ax)R(x) is a true sentence of the interpretation M of P”, are equivalent to the meta-assertion “R(x) is 
satisfied for any given value of x in the domain of the interpretation M of P” ([Me64], p51). 
 
10 We follow Mendelson’s definition of an algorithm as an effectively computable function ([Me64], p208), 
with the proviso that such computability is, necessarily, by some uniform rule, or method. Subject to their 
being individually proven as formal mathematical objects - a concept that we define precisely - we also 
follow Mendelson’s set-theoretic definitions of a “function” and of a “relation” ([Me64], p6-7). In other 
words, since we intend to argue later that there may be number-theoretic functions that are not definable as 
formal mathematical objects in any Axiomatic Set Theory, we treat the sets in Mendelson’s definitions as 
hypothetical and intuitive, but not formal, mathematical objects. Therefore, assuming formal set-theoretic 
properties for them, even in informal reasoning, may invite inconsistency. 
 
11 The term “constructive” is used both in its familiar, linguistic, sense, and in a mathematically precise 
sense. Mathematically, we term a concept as “constructive” if, and only if, it can be defined in terms of pre-
existing concepts without inviting inconsistency (cf. Mendelson’s remarks in [Me64], p82). Otherwise, we 
understand it in an intuitive sense to mean unambiguously verifiable, by some “effective method” ([Me64], 
p207-8), within some finite, well-defined, language or meta-language ([Me64], p31, footnote). Generally, it 
may be taken to correspond, broadly, to Gödel’s concept of “intuitionistically unobjectionable” ([Go31a], 
p26). 
 
However, the concept of “effective method” (as well its synonym, “mechanical procedure”) are not at all 
precise in classical theory. As Mendelson notes ([Me64], p207), “... what we mean is a process which 
requires no ingenuity for its performance”. In these essays, we consider some consequences of defining 
these critical concepts precisely in appropriate contexts. 
 
12 We briefly discuss some of the issues involved in the representation of mental concepts within a formal 
language in §II-5, “Can all mental concepts be expressed mathematically?”. 
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meta-theorems, nor with details of their fascinating meta-proofs13. For the purist, Gödel’s 
original, 1931, paper (cf. [Go31a] and [Go31b]) remains unsurpassed as the definitive 
source for a study of the Theorems, and of their immediate consequences. For the 
interested, popular discussions of the Theorems, and of their commonly perceived 
meanings and implications, are lucidly provided, and extensively referenced, by Penrose 
in [Pe90], and in [Pe94].  
What interests us here, rather, is the possibility that there may be a “loophole”, in the 
classical interpretation of Gödel’s conclusion, which allows us to define mathematical 
truth in an effectively verifiable way. We, thus, limit ourselves to reviewing, essentially 
from a layperson’s perspective, the argument that any formal system of Peano 
Arithmetic14, PA, based on Dedekind’s formulation of the Peano Postulates15, is 
essentially incomplete16.  
                                               
13 We use words such as “proof”, “meta-mathematics”, “meta-theorem”, “meta-proof”, “meta-language”, 
etc., both in their familiar linguistic sense, and in a mathematically precise sense; the appropriate meaning 
is usually obvious from the context. As Mendelson notes (cf. [Me64], p29 and footnote on p31): 
 
“The word ‘proof’ is used in two distinct senses. First, it has a precise meaning defined above as a certain 
finite sequence of wfs of L. However, in another sense, it also designates certain sequences of sentences of 
the English language (supplemented by various technical terms) which are supposed to serve as an 
argument justifying some some assertions about the language L (or other formal theories). In general, the 
language we are studying (in this case L) is called the object language, while the language in which we 
formulate and prove results about the object language is called the metalanguage. The metalanguage might 
also be formalized and made the subject of study, which we would carry out in a meta-metalanguage, etc. 
However, we shall use the English language as our (unformalized) metalanguage, although, for a 
substantial part of this book, we employ only a mathematically weak portion of the English language. The 
contrast between object language and metalanguage is also present in the study of a foreign language; for 
example, in a German class, German is the object language, while the metalanguage, the language we use, 
is English. The distinction between ‘proof’ and ‘metaproof’ (i.e., a proof in the metalanguage) leads to a 
distinction between theorems of the object language and metatheorems of the metalanguage. To avoid 
confusion, we generally use ‘proposition’ instead of ‘metatheorem’. The word ‘metamathematics’ refers to 
the study of logical and mathematical object languages; sometimes the word is restricted to those 
investigations which use what appear to the metamathematician to be constructive (or so-called finitary) 
methods.” 
 
14 By a formal system of Peano Arithmetic, we mean an intended formalisation, of Dedekind’s formulation 
of the intuitively-interpreted Peano Axioms, such as Gödel’s formal system P ([Go31a], p9), Mendelson’s 
first order theory S ([Me64], p102), or Podnieks first order arithmetic PA2 ([Po01], §3.1).  
 
We note that Mendelson’s first-order theory S: 
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Specifically, we consider whether the classical interpretation of Gödel’s argument - that 
there is some undecidable17 arithmetical proposition (which we may refer to as GUS, and 
formally write as the well-formed formula18 [(Ax)R(x)]) that is unprovable19 in PA, but 
                                                                                                                                            
 
“...has a single predicate letter A12 (as usual, we write t = s for A12 (t, s); it has one individual constant a1 
(written, as usual, 0); it has three function letters f11, f12, f22. We shall write t' instead of f11(t); t + s instead 
of f12(t, s); and t*s instead of f22(t, s)”, and the following axioms: 
 
(S1) (x1 = x2) => ((x1 = x3) => (x2 = x3)) 
(S2) (x1 = x2) => (x1' = x2') 
(S3) 0 =/= x1' 
(S4) (x1' = x2') => (x1 = x2) 
(S5) (x1 + 0) = x1 
(S6) (x1 + x2') = (x1 + x2)' 
(S7) (x1*0) = 0 
(S8) (x1* x2') = ((x1* x2) + x1) 
(S9) For any well-formed formula F(x) of S, F(0) => ((A x)(F(x) => F(x')) => (A x)F(x)” 
 
15 We follow Mendelson’s following formulation ([Me64], p102) of Dedekind’s (1901) presentation of the 
Peano’s Postulates: 
 
(P1) 0 is a natural number. 
(P2) If x is a natural number, there is another natural number denoted by x' (and called the successor of x). 
(P3) 0 =/= x' for any natural number x. 
(P4) If x' = y', then x = y. 
(P5) If Q is a property which may, or may not, hold of natural numbers, and if (I) 0 has the property Q, and 
(II) whenever a natural number x has the property Q, then x' has the property Q, then all natural numbers 
have the property Q (Principle of Induction). 
 
16 We define a language L as “essentially incomplete” if, and only if, L, and every consistent axiomatic 
extension L' of L, has some undecidable sentence, i.e., some proposition F such that both [F] and [~F] are 
not provable in the language (each extension may have a different undecidable proposition). We define a 
language as axiomatic if, and only if, there is an effective method for determining whether any given well-
formed formula of the language is an axiom. We define an extension L' of a language L as the language 
obtained by adding a finite number of well-formed formulas to the axioms of L. 
 
17 A formal proposition [R] is undecidable in a language L if, and only if, both [R] and [~R] are unprovable 
in L, where, under the standard interpretation of L, ~R interprets as the negation of R. 
 
18 By a “well-formed formula”, we refer to any finite concatenation of the symbols of a formal language, 
constructed according to specified rules of the grammar of the language for the formation of well-formed 
formulas, to which we attach no meaning. Where the intention is clear from the context, we may refer to a 
“well-formed formula” simply as a “formula”. 
 
19 We define a formula [F] of a finitely axiomatisable formal language L as provable in L if, and only if, 
there is a finite sequence of L-formulas, ending in [F], such that each formula of the sequence is either an 
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true, under the standard interpretation20 M of PA - is constructive, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable21. 
We then consider whether, under a suitably constructive interpretation of classical, 
Tarskian, truth, and of Gödel’s reasoning, any formal system of Peano Arithmetic - 
classically accepted as the foundation of all our mathematical languages - is verifiably 
complete, and indicate some consequences of such an interpretation.  
We, finally, address, and review, the questions22: 
(1) Are Platonism and Formalism incompatible doctrines? 
(2) Is mathematical truth verifiable effectively? 
                                                                                                                                            
axiom of L, or an immediate consequence of some of the formulas preceding it, in the sequence, by means 
of the rules of inference of L. We define [F] as unprovable in L if, and only if, there is no such sequence.  
 
20 We follow Mendelson’s definitions of “standard interpretation” ([Me64], p107) as: 
 
“... the interpretation in which 
 
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain, 
(b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol 0, 
(c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the ' function (i.e., of f11), 
(d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of + and ., 
(e) the interpretation of the predicate letter = is the identity relation.” 
 
In other words, the interpreted relation R(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of a formal system P by 
replacing every primitive, undefined, symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical 
symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically well-defined, concept of classical 
mathematics) as in (a)-(e). 
 
21 We generally use the words “constructive / non-constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable / 
objectionable” in Gödel’s, rather broad, sense, as expressed by him at the end of his proof of Theorem VI 
in his 1931 paper [Go31a] on formally undecidable propositions.  
 
Gödel remarks: “One can easily convince oneself that the proof we have just given is constructive (for all 
the existential assertions occurring in the proof rest upon Theorem V which, as it is easy to see, is 
intuitionistically unobjectionable), ...”.  
 
22 Since these issues are sought to be addressed independently, there is an element of repetition - for which 
the author begs the readers’ indulgence - that could, perhaps, have been avoided, but possibly at the 
expense of readability and clarity of exposition.  
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(3) What is the significance of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem? 
(4) What is the significance of Turing's Halting Theorem? 
(5) Can all mental concepts be expressed mathematically? 
(6) Can Peano Arithmetic model some of the more paradoxical concepts of Quantum 
Mechanics? 
I-2 Is Gödel’s undecidable proposition true in a constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, way? 
Now, classically, Gödel’s well-formed formula [(Ax)R(x)] does translate as a true 
sentence under the standard interpretation of PA. However, in general, there is nothing 
intuitive or constructive - in the sense of being effectively verifiable - about such “truth”.  
The proposition is “true” only if we accept: 
Tarski’s definition23: A well-formed formula [(Ax)F(x)] of a language L is true 
under an interpretation M of L if, and only if, the interpreted relation24, F(x), is 
satisfied by every x in M. 
                                               
23 We take Mendelson ([Me64], p49-52) as a standard exposition of Tarski’s definitions of the 
“satisfiability” and “truth” of well-formed formulas under a given interpretation: 
 
“The notions of satisfiability and truth are intuitively clear, but, for the skeptical, they can be made precise 
in the following way (cf. [Ta36], p261-405). Let there be given an interpretation with domain D. Let S be 
the set of denumerable sequences of elements of D. We shall define what it means for a sequence s = (b1, 
b2, ...) in S to satisfy a wf A under the given interpretation. As a preliminary step we define a function s* of 
one argument, with terms as arguments and values in D. 
 
(1) If t is xi, let s*(t) be bi. 
(2) If t is an individual constant, then s*(t) is the interpretation in D of this constant. 
(3) If fj
n is a function letter and g is the corresponding operation in D, and t1, ..., tn are terms, then s*( fjn(t1, 
..., tn)) = g(s*(t1), ..., s*(tn)). 
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Although this appears to be a fairly innocent formalisation of intuitive truth, we note, 
first, that it is silent on the question of how, for any interpretation M, we can effectively 
determine whether the relation F(x) is, indeed, satisfied by every x in M.  
Second, it does not distinguish between languages of expression, which are intended to 
capture elements, of the mental gestalt of an individual, within a symbolic language 
(reasonably, these would include our spoken and written languages, as also sign 
languages, painting, sculpture, music, etc.), and languages of communication, which are 
                                                                                                                                            
Thus, s* is a function, determined by the sequence s, from the set of terms into D. Intuitively, for a 
sequence s = (b1, b2, ...) and a term t, s*(t) is the element of D obtained by substituting, for each i, bi for all 
occurences of xi in t, and then performing the operations of the interpretation corresponding to the function 
letters of t. For instance, if t is f22(x3, f12(x1, a1)), and the interpretation has the set of integers as its domain, 
f22 and f12 are interpreted as ordinary multiplication and addition, and a1 is interpreted as 2, then, for any 
sequence s = (b1, b2, ...) of integers, s*(t) is the integer b3 x (b1 + 2). 
 
Now we proceed to the definition proper, which is an inductive definition. 
 
(i) If A is an atomic wf Aj
n(t1, ..., tn) and Bjn is the corresponding relation of the interpretation, then the 
sequence s satisfies A if and only if Bj
n(s*(t1), ..., s*(tn)), i.e., if the n-tuple (s*(t1), ..., s*(tn)) is in the 
relation Bj
n. 
 
(ii) s satisfies ~A if and only if s does not satisfy A. 
 
(iii) s satisfies A => B if and only if either s does not satisfy A or s satisfies B. 
 
(iv) s satisfies (xi)A if and only if every sequence of S which differs from s in at most the i’th component 
satisfies A. 
 
Intuitively, a sequence s = (b1, b2, ...) satisfies a wf A if and only if, when we substitute, for each i, a 
symbol representing bi for all free occurences of xi in A, the resulting proposition is true under the given 
interpretation. 
 
A wf A is true (for the given interpretation) if and only if every sequence in S satisfies A. 
 
A is false (for the given interpretation) if and only if no sequence in S satisfies A. 
 
An interpretation is said to be a model for a set T of wfs if and only if every wf in T is true for the 
interpretation.” 
 
For a detailed overview of Tarski’s truth definitions, see [Hw01]. 
 
24 The word “predicate” is often used as a synonym for “relation”. 
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intended to distinguish, and effectively communicate, those of such individual concepts 
that are accepted as lying within what may be accepted, and termed, as a common 
collective of gestalts.  
This lack of distinction is reflected in the oft-encountered - and, as we argue, 
unnecessary25 - controversy between those who believe that whatever can be conceived 
must exist in a Platonic world, and those who believe that only that which can be 
communicated effectively can be claimed to exist.  
Moreover, a significant consequence - of the failure to distinguish between Platonic 
conception and effective communication - is that Tarski’s definition implicitly commits 
us to admitting, in a formal language, such as, say, PA, implicit reference to Platonic 
elements, in the domain of an interpretation M of PA, that are, clearly, non-intuitive, and 
conceivable only subjectively in individual gestalts26.  
Thus, the definition (implicitly) implies that we may (explicitly) assert the closure of a 
formal relation under the universal quantifier as satisfied in M if, and only if, the relation 
is individually, and collectively, satisfied by all the elements in the ontology of M, even 
if some elements of this ontology are not interpretations of any mathematical objects that 
are representable27 in PA! 
                                               
25 We address this issue separately in §II-1, “Are Platonism and Formalism incompatible doctrines?”. 
 
26 In other words, Tarski’s definitions implicitly lend legitimacy to the belief that abstract mathematical 
concepts are objective mathematical realities that can be perceived in a manner analogous to sense 
perception. Known as mathematical realism, such a philosophy holds that mathematical entities exist 
independently of the human mind.  
 
The major problem of mathematical realism is this: precisely where and how do the mathematical entities 
exist? Is there a world, completely separate from our physical one, which is occupied by the mathematical 
entities? How can we gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities? 
 
27 The words “expressible” and “representable” can, generally, be understood in their familiar, linguistic, 
sense. However, when used in a mathematical sense (the appropriate sense is usually obvious from the 
context) we follow Mendelson’s terminology and definitions of the “expressibility” ([Me64], §2, p117), 
and “representability” ([Me64], §2, p118), of number-theoretic relations and functions, respectively, in a 
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Now, a constructive view of Gödel’s reasoning, as suggested in these essays, is that such 
a broad, and implicit (hence ambiguous), commitment is unnecessary, even if it is not 
formally invalid. It should, then, follow that, by the principle of Occams razor, we ought 
not to unrestrictedly assert [R(x)] as collectively satisfied by all x in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, although we may assert that [R(x)] is satisfied individually by any 
given x in M. 
The significance of this, last, distinction is that the totality of values for which [R(x)] is 
satisfied in M is not, then, constructively definable as a formal mathematical object. In 
other words, the classical assumption that such values define a “set” in any Axiomatic Set 
Theory such as ZFC may, when interpreted constructively, introduce an anomaly, if not 
an inconsistency. Thus, we may not be able to make any constructively meaningful 
assertion about the totality of values that satisfy [R(x)] in M. 
More precisely, we argue that every recursive28 number-theoretic29 relation need not be 
accepted as well-defining a (recursively enumerable30) sub-set of the natural numbers in 
any Axiomatic Set Theory that is a consistent31 extension of PA32, if we define a 
mathematical object and a set constructively as follows: 
                                                                                                                                            
formal system such as P. However, following Gödel, we also refer to a number-theoretic relation as being 
“representable” in P when, strictly speaking, we mean that it is “expressible” in P as defined by Mendelson. 
 
28 We follow Mendelson’s definitions of primitive recursive, and recursive functions and relations ([Me64], 
p120, 125). Primitive recursive functions / relations have the property that, for any set of natural number 
values given to their variables, the functions / relations are finitely computable / decidable on the basis of 
the axioms of any formal Peano Arithmetic. 
 
29 A number-theoretic function is one whose arguments and values are natural numbers, and a number-
theoretic relation is a relation whose arguments are natural numbers ([Me64], p117). 
 
30 A recursively enumerable set is classically defined ([Me64], p250) as the range of some recursive 
number-theoretic function that, treated as a well-defined set, is implicitly assumed to be consistent with any 
Axiomatic Set Theory that is a model for PA. 
 
31 We define a language L as consistent if, and only if, there is no formula F of L such that both F and ~F 
(i.e., not F) are theorems in L, where we define F as a theorem of L if, and only if, there is a finite sequence 
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Definition (i): A primitive mathematical object, of a formal mathematical language, 
L, is any symbol for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter (cf. 
[Me64], p46; also p1, p10), which is defined as a primitive symbol of L. 
Definition (ii): A formal mathematical object, of a formal mathematical language, L, 
is any symbol for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is 
either a primitive mathematical object of L, or one that can be introduced through 
definition (cf. [Me64], p82) into L without inviting inconsistency.33 
Definition (iii): A mathematical object, of a formal mathematical language, L, is any 
symbol that is either a primitive, or a formal, mathematical object of L. 
Definition (iv): A set, in the domain of any interpretation, M, of a formal 
mathematical language, L, is the range of any function in M that is an interpretation 
of a function letter that is a mathematical object of L. 
                                                                                                                                            
of formulas of L, ending in F, such that each formula in the sequence is either an axiom of L, or a 
consequence of some of the formulas preceding it in the sequence by the deduction rules of the language. 
 
32 This means, loosely speaking, that we may not be able to give a set-theoretic definition, of, say, Gödel’s 
primitive recursive function Sb(x v|Z(y)), such that {x | x=Sb(y 19|Z(y))} defines a set in any Axiomatic 
Set Theory with a Separation Axiom, or its equivalent, without introducing inconsistency.  
 
Consequently, if we cannot consistently assume that every recursive function formally defines a recursively 
enumerable set, then it follows that we are unable to define a recursive set as a recursively enumerable set 
whose complement is also recursively enumerable. In some cases, there may be no such complement. 
 
It further follows that, if F(y) is an arithmetical function such that F(k) = Sb(k 19|Z(k)) for any given k, the 
assertion that the expression {x | x=F(y)} defines a formal set by the Separation Axiom may require 
additional qualification. 
 
33 We note, incidentally, that, by defining a mathematical object precisely, the paradoxical element in the 
mathematical and logical “antinomies” is effectively eliminated; they define functions or relations that are 
not mathematical objects. Prima facie, except from a Platonic viewpoint, it thus seems of little significance 
whether such definitions are taken as defining concepts that are mathematically inconsistent (square circle), 
arguably inconsistent (Pegasus), logically inconsistent (Russell’s impredicative set), or mathematical non-
objects (the non-constructive elements of any axiomatic set theory). 
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Constructively, as a consequence of the arguments cited above, expressions such as 
“(Ax)F(x)”, and “(Ex)F(x)”, in an interpretation M of a formal theory P, may be taken to 
mean34 “F(x) is true for all x in M”, and “F(x) is true for some x in M”, respectively, if, 
and only if, the predicate letter “F” is a formal mathematical object in P.  
In the absence of a proof that “F” is such a mathematical object, the expressions 
“(Ax)F(x)” and “(Ex)F(x)” can, constructively, only be taken to mean that “F(x) is true 
for any given x in M”, and “It is not true that F(x) is false for any given x in M”, 
indicating that the predicate “F(x)” is well-defined, and decidable, for any given value of 
x, but that there may not be any uniformly effective method for such decidability. 
I-3 What exactly does this mean, and why is the distinction 
important? 
The question arises: What exactly does this mean, and why is the distinction important? 
Taking the latter part of the question first, the distinction is important because we do not, 
then, need to accept absolute limits on our ability to adequately formalise, and effectively 
communicate, mathematical concepts that are accepted as being common to a collective 
of gestalts35.  
Now, a central issue in the development of any significant Artificial Intelligence is that of 
understanding36, and finding, effective methods of duplicating the cognitive and 
                                               
34 We treat such, i.e., interpreted, symbolic expressions merely as abbreviations of semantically well-
defined assertions of a language of communication in which we express our cognitive experiences. 
 
35 For instance, any recursively definable language would be considered as a mental concept that is 
common to a collective of gestalts. 
 
36 For instance, Manin [Ma02] draws attention to a paper in "Science", [DS99], that “summarizes some 
experimental results throwing light on the nature of mental representation of mathematical objects and 
physio-logical roots of divergences between, say, intuitionists and formalists”, as below: 
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expressive processes of the human mind. This issue is being increasingly brought into 
sharper focus by the rapid advances in the experimental, behavioral, and computer 
sciences37.  
Penrose’s “The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind” highlight what is 
striking about the attempts, and struggles, of current work in these areas to express their 
observations adequately - necessarily in a predictable way38 - within the 
standard interpretations of formal propositions as offered by classical theory.  
So, the question arises: Are formal classical theories essentially unable to adequately 
express the extent and range of human cognition, or does the problem lie in the way 
formal theories are classically interpreted at the moment?  
The former addresses the question of whether there are absolute limits on our capacity to 
express human cognition unambiguously; the latter, whether there are only temporal 
limits - not necessarily absolute - to the capacity of classical interpretations to 
communicate unambiguously that which we intended to capture within our formal 
expression. 
 Now, a thesis of these essays is that we may comfortably reject the first, by recognising 
that we can, indeed, constructively extend Tarski’s definitions, of the “satisfiability” and 
                                                                                                                                            
"[...] our results provide grounds for reconciling the divergent introspection of mathematicians by showing 
that even within the small domain of elementary arithmetic, multiple mental representations are used for 
different tasks. Exact arithmetic puts emphasis on language-specific representations and relies on a left 
inferior frontal circuit also used for generating associations between words. Symbolic arithmetic is a 
cultural invention specific to humans, and its development depended on the progressive improvement of 
number notation systems. [...] 
 
Approximate arithmetic, in contrast, shows no dependence on language and relies primarily on a quantity 
representation implemented in visuo-spatial networks of the left and right parietal lobes." 
 
37 See, for instance ([RH01], footnote 18). 
 
38 We address this issue separately in §II-2, “Is mathematical truth verifiable effectively?”. 
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“truth” of formal relations and propositions, respectively, under a given interpretation, 
verifiably. 
I-4 A constructive definition of Tarskian satisfiability 
So, we return to the first part of the earlier question: What exactly does this mean? 
Well, it means that we can, for instance, replace the strong39, classical, implicit 
interpretation of Tarski’s non-constructive definition, which is essentially the assertion: 
(i) Classical satisfiability: The well-formed formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is 
satisfied classically under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, the 
interpreted predicate F(x) is satisfied collectively, and individually, by the elements 
in the domain of M, 
by the weaker, explicit assertion: 
The well-formed formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is satisfied constructively under 
an interpretation M of P if, and only if, the interpreted predicate F(x) is satisfied 
either collectively, or individually, by the elements in the domain of M. 
We can, further, eliminate any implicit commitment to a Platonic ontology by making 
this definition constructive - in the sense of being effectively verifiable, as follows: 
(ii) Individual satisfiability: The well-formed formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is 
individually satisfied under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k 
in M, there is an individually effective method (which may depend on the value k) to 
determine that the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
                                               
39 As remarked earlier, such a strong assertion may also be invalid under a constructive interpretation of 
Gödel’s reasoning in Theorem VI of his 1931 paper [Go31a]. 
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(iii) Uniform satisfiability: The well-formed formula [F(x)] of a formal system P 
is uniformly40 satisfied under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a 
uniformly effective method (necessarily independent of x) such that, given any 
value k in M, it can determine that the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(iv) Constructive satisfiability: The well-formed formula [F(x)] of a formal system 
P is constructively satisfied under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either 
uniformly satisfied in M, or it is individually satisfied in M.  
Clearly, if [F(x)] is uniformly satisfied in M, then it is, obviously, individually satisfied 
in M. However, does the converse hold? More to the point, could Gödel’s undecidable 
proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], be an instance of a formula [R(x)] that is individually satisfied in 
M (since Gödel shows that [R(k)] is provable in P for any numeral [k]), but not uniformly 
satisfied in M?41 
An interesting consequence of an affirmative answer to this question would be that 
the interpreted arithmetical predicate R(x) - which is instantiationally equivalent42 to a 
primitive recursive relation - becomes Turing-undecidable43! Prima facie, this would 
appear to conflict with the classical postulation that a number-theoretic function is 
                                               
40 From here on, we prefer the term “uniformly” to “collectively”, since the former is a familiar concept in 
various areas of mathematical reasoning, and the distinction - between individual satisfiability / truth and 
uniform satisfiability / truth - is very similar to the important distinction between, for instance, continuous 
functions ([Ru53], p65, §4.5) and uniformly continuous functions ([Ru53], p67, §4.13), and between 
convergent sequences ([Ru53], p115, §7.1) and uniformly convergent sequences ([Ru53], p118, §7.7).  
 
41 We address this issue separately in §II-3, “What is the significance of Gödel’s First Incompleteness 
Theorem?”. 
 
42 Two number-theoretic relations, say f(x) and g(x), are defined as instantiationally equivalent if, and only 
if, for any given natural number n, f(n) holds if, and only if, g(n) holds. 
 
43 We presume a degree of familiarity with the computability concepts introduced by Turing in his seminal 
paper [Tu36]. 
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Turing-computable if, and only if, it is partial recursive44. However, the conflict may 
be illusory: the proof of equivalence seems to presume45 that there is always a uniformly 
effective method for computing any given partial recursive function46. This proof would 
be invalid if we held, constructively, that Gödel has shown there are total47 arithmetical 
functions, and relations, that may not be computable, or decidable, respectively, by any 
uniformly effective method48. 
I-5 Extending Church’s Thesis and defining effective computability 
A key question, of course, is: why change? 
One reason is that of verifiability. We are now able to define effective computability 
constructively, i.e., in a verifiable manner, by addressing the questions: 
 (v) Individual effective method: When may we constructively assume that, given 
any sequence s of an interpretation M of P, there is an individually effective method 
to determine that s satisfies a given P-formula in M?  
                                               
44 A standard proof of this is given by Mendelson ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13 and p237, Corollary 5.15). 
 
45 This may, indeed, have been the presumption that allowed Turing [Tu36] to assert the essential 
equivalence between Gödel’s definition of an undecidable, but true, arithmetical proposition, and his own 
definition of a number-theoretic Turing-uncomputable Halting function. 
 
46 See ([Me64], p226, Corollary 5.11). 
 
47 We define a number-theoretic function, or relation, as total if, and only if, it is individually computable, 
or individually decidable, respectively. 
 
48 In other words, although, for any given set of numerical values for its variables, a recursive function / 
relation is individually computable / decidable from the axioms of any Peano Arithmetic, there may be no 
common proof sequence within the Arithmetic that can compute / decide the function / relation for an 
arbitrary assignment of numerical values for its variables. 
 
 18
 (vi) Uniformly effective method: When may we constructively assume that there is 
a uniformly effective method such that, given any sequence s of an interpretation M, 
s satisfies a given P-formula in M? 
If the domain D of M can be assumed representable in P, then (v) can, indeed, be 
answered constructively; we simply extend the classical Church Thesis49 as follows: 
(vii) Individual Church Thesis: If, for a given relation R(x), and any value a in 
some interpretation M of P, there is an individually effective method such that it will 
determine whether R(a) holds in M or not, then every element of the domain D of M 
is the interpretation of some term of P, and there is some P-formula [R'(x)] such that: 
 R(a) holds in M if, and only if, [R'(a)] is P-provable. 
(In other words, the Individual Church Thesis postulates that the domain of a relation 
R that is effectively decidable individually in an interpretation M of some formal 
system P can only consist of mathematical objects, even if R is not, itself, a 
mathematical object.) 
Moreover, (vi), too, can be answered constructively for any interpretation M of P, if we 
postulate: 
(viii) Uniform Church Thesis: If, in some interpretation M of P, there is a uniformly 
effective method such that, for a given relation R(x), and any value a in M, it will 
determine whether R(a) holds in M or not, then R(x) is the interpretation in M of a P-
formula [R(x)], and: 
                                               
49 We take the classical Church Thesis as the assertion that a number-theoretic function is effectively 
computable (partially) if, and only if, it is (partially) recursive ([Me64], p147, p227). 
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 R(a) holds in M if, and only if, [R(a)] is P-provable. 
(Thus, the Uniform Church Thesis postulates, first, that the domain of a relation R 
that is effectively decidable uniformly in an interpretation M of a formal system P can 
only consist of mathematical objects; and, second, that R, too, is necessarily a 
mathematical object.) 
I-6 Some consequences, and a definition of uniform completeness 
Some interesting consequences of the above are that: 
(ix) The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that a formula [R] is constructively P-
provable if, and only if, [R] is uniformly satisfied in some interpretation M of P. 
(x) The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that if a number-theoretic relation R(x) is 
uniformly satisfied in some interpretation M of P, then the predicate letter “R” is a 
formal mathematical object in P (i.e. it can be introduced through definition into P 
without inviting inconsistency). 
(xi) The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that, if a P-formula [R] is uniformly satisfied 
in some interpretation M of P, then [R] is uniformly satisfied in every interpretation 
of P. 
(xii) The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that if a formula [R] is not P-provable, but 
[R] is classically true under the standard interpretation, then [R] is individually 
satisfied, but not uniformly satisfied, in the standard interpretation of P. 
(xiii) The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that Gödel’s undecidable sentence GUS is 
individually satisfied, but not uniformly satisfied, in the standard interpretation of P. 
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(xiv) Under constructive extensions of Tarski’s definitions  of the satisfiability of the 
propositions of a formal mathematical language, P, under an interpretation, and of 
Church’s Thesis, the domains of any two interpretations of P are denumerable (since 
they are representable in P) and isomorphic50. 
(xv) Under constructive extensions of Tarski’s definitions  of the satisfiability of the 
propositions of a formal mathematical language, P, under an interpretation, and of 
Church’s Thesis, P is uniformly complete, in the sense that: 
Definition (v): A formal system P is uniformly complete if, and only if, a formula 
[R] is P-provable if, and only if, it is uniformly satisfied in some model of P. 
We can also define effective computability, both individually and uniformly, along 
similar lines:  
(xvi) Individual computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is individually 
computable if, and only if, given any natural number k, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to compute F(k). 
                                               
50 By “isomorphism”, we mean the concept described by Mendelson ([Me64], p90) as follows: 
 
“We shall say that an interpretation M of the wfs of some first-order theory K is isomorphic with another 
interpretation M' of K if and only if there is a 1-1 correspondence g (called an isomorphism) of the domain 
D of M with the domain D' of M' such that:  
 
(i) If (Aj
n)* and (Aj
n)' are the interpretations in M and M', respectively, of Aj
n, then, for any b1, ..., bn in D, 
((Aj
n)*(b1, ..., bn) if and only if (Ajn)'(g(b1), ..., g(bn)). 
 
(ii) If (fj
n)* and (fj
n)' are the interpretations of fj
n in M and M', respectively, then, for any b1, ..., bn in D, 
g((fj
n)*(b1, ..., bn)) = (fjn)'(g(b1), ..., g(bn)). 
 
(iii) If aj* and aj' are the interpretations of the individual constants aj in M and M', respectively, then 
g(aj)* = aj'. 
 
Notice that if M and M' are isomorphic, their domains must be of the same cardinality.” 
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(xvii) Uniform computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is uniformly 
computable if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x)  such that, given any natural number k, it can compute F(k). 
(xviii) Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is either individually computable, or it is uniformly 
computable. 
We can, then, give a constructive definition of uncomputable number-theoretic functions: 
(xix) Classical uncomputability: A number-theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) in the 
standard interpretation M of P is classically uncomputable if, and only if, it is 
effectively computable individually, but not effectively computable uniformly. 
This, last, removes the mysticism behind the fact that we can define a total number-
theoretic Halting function that is, paradoxically, Turing-uncomputable. Ipso facto, it also 
validates some of the constructive objections (cf. [Hw98]) to Cantor’s argument, that the 
cardinality51 of the set of real numbers exceeds that of the set of integers. 
If we accept the classical definition of a number as real if, and only if, it is the limit of a 
Cauchy sequence52 of rational numbers53, and that of a sequence of rationals as a function 
                                               
51 The cardinal number C(Y) of a set Y is defined to be the set of all sets X that are equinumerous with Y 
(i.e., for which there is a one-one correspondence between Y and X). (cf. [Me64], p2). 
 
52 A numerical sequence {sn} is said to be a Cauchy sequence if, and only if, for every e > 0 there is an 
integer N such that n >= N, m >= N implies |sn - sm| =< e. (cf. [Ru53], p39, Definition, §3.10).  
 
The importance of Cauchy sequences in mathematics is that a numerical sequence {sn} converges if, and 
only if, it is a Cauchy sequence. (cf. [Ru53], p39, Theorem, §3.11). 
 
53 This follows from the equivalence between the theorem that a sequence {sn} converges if, and only if, it 
is a Cauchy sequence ([Ru53], p39, §3.11), and the theorem that every Dedekind cut ([Ru53], p3, §1.4) 
defines a unique real number ([Ru53], p9, §1.32). 
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whose domain is the integers, and whose range is the rationals (i.e., the function defining 
the sequence is a mapping from the integers into the rationals), then Cantor’s diagonal 
argument54 simply shows that some real numbers are generated by classically 
uncomputable functions that are not effectively computable uniformly. 
However, since, constructively, the function must be effectively computable individually, 
and there can only be denumerable effectively computable functions (by §(xiv) above), it 
follows that: 
(xix)(a) Under constructive extensions of Tarski’s definitions  of the satisfiability of 
the propositions of a formal mathematical language, P, under an interpretation, and of 
Church’s Thesis, the real numbers are denumerable (hence Cantor’s Theorem55 does 
not hold).  
                                               
54 Cantor’s diagonal argument is that if w e assume there is some sequence {fn} that maps the integers onto 
the real numbers (i.e., every integer occurs somewhere in the mapping) then we can define a real number 
that is not in the mapping - a contradiction. He concludes, therefore, that there can be no such mapping and, 
by definition, the cardinality of the reals must exceed that of the integers (in other words, in some sense, 
there must be more real numbers than there are integers).  
 
However, constructively, the argument is unacceptable (cf. also [An03b]) since, if the sequence {fn} is 
effectively uncomputable uniformly, we cannot define a real number that is not in the mapping. In other 
words, since, given any n, we may have that fn is effectively computable individually, but there is no 
uniformly effective method such that, given any n, it will compute fn, we cannot define a real number by 
Cantor’s diagonal argument, as this, last, presumes that { fn} can be treated as uniformly computable. 
 
55 Cantor’s (Power Set) Theorem ([Me64], Proposition 4.23, p183) is that, in any axiomatic set theory such 
as, say, ZFC, there can be no 1-1 correspondence between the members of the power set P(x) of any set x 
(intuitively, the set of all sub-sets of x), and the members of x. This theorem, however, appeals critically to 
the Separation Axiom of ZFC. Such an axiom admits the range of, both, uniformly computable, and 
individually computable, number-theoretic functions as mathematical objects of ZFC.  
 
Classical theory simply terms the range of number-theoretic functions that are effectively computable 
uniformly as recursive sets that are also recursively enumerable, and the range of functions that are 
effectively computable individually, but not uniformly, as sets that are recursively enumerable, but not 
recursive.  
 
Constructively, whilst the former sets may be validly assumed to be mathematical objects of ZFC, the latter 
may not, and any such assumption may invite inconsistency. This is the gist of the argument that we 
attempt to formalise in Meta-hypothesis 1 (the arguments for this are still tentative, and under revision) and 
its corollaries in §4 and §5 of Anand [An02c]. 
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I-7 The Uniform Church Thesis and the classical Church-Turing 
Theses56 
The significance, of defining the satisfiability of a for mula of P under interpretation 
explicitly in terms of individually, and uniformly, effective methods, and of expressing 
Church’s Thesis constructively, is seen if we note that any computer can be designed to 
recognise a “looping” situation; it simply records57 every instantaneous tape description at 
the execution of each machine instruction, and compares the current instantaneous tape 
description58 with the record59.  
Now, we could instruct such a machine to assign arbitrary values to those undefined 
instances of the Halting predicate whose occurrences cause the machine to loop. Prima 
facie, this would define an individually effective decision method that is dependent 
entirely on the particular Halting function that is being computed, and cannot be 
predicted. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
56 This section presumes a degree of familiarity with the comp utability concepts introduced by Turing in his 
seminal paper [Tu36], and with classical interpretations of his reasoning as contained in, say, Mendelson 
([Me64], p229-257). 
 
57 We may picture this operation as that of, say, a virtual teleprinter, with an infinite two-dimensional 
memory, that permanently records the instantaneous tape description of a Turing machine, after the 
execution of each machine instruction, as a new, finite, line array - and with facilities for comparing the 
current array with the previous record and interrupting the operation of the Turing machine at the onset of a 
loop (repeated array). 
 
58 “An instantaneous tape description describes the condition of the machine and the tape at a given 
moment. When read from left to right, the tape symbols in the description represent the symbols on the tape 
at the moment. The internal state qs in the description is the internal state of the machine at the moment, 
and the tape symbol occurring immediately to the right of qs in the tape description represents the symbol 
being scanned by the machine at the moment.” ([Me64], p230, footnote 1). 
 
59 In principle, there is nothing i n the definition of a Turing machine that bars such an operation, which 
would be that of a deterministic Turing -oracle, as discussed in §II-4.  
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Is such a machine a Turing machine? The classical answer to this question is not obvious 
if we do not appeal to the Turing Thesis 60.  
However: 
(xx) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis , then every partial recursive number-
theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) may have a unique constructive extension as a total 
function61. 
(xxi) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis , then not every effectively computable 
function is classically Turing computable (so Turing’s Thesis  does not, then, hold). 
(xxii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis , then not every (partially) recursive 
function is classically Turing-computable. 
II Some significant issues in interpreting classical theory 
constructively 
Although detailed proofs of the above consequences lie outside the scope of this essay62, 
we review below, in a broader perspective, some of the significant issues, highlighted 
above, which indicate the need for balancing classical interpretations of Cantor’s, 
Gödel’s, Tarski’s, and Turing’s reasoning by  an alternative, constructive and 
                                               
60 Turing’s Thesis is that every effectively computable function is classically Turing computable ([Me64], 
p237). Although also referred to as the Church-Turing Thesis, CT, the latter is significantly different in that 
it implies that the Turing Thesis is equivalent to Church’s Thesis. We consider the universal validity of 
Turing’s Thesis, and of the equivalence, in §II-4, “What is the significance of Turing's Halting Theorem? ”. 
 
61 In other words, because the Turing machine that is computing the function loops for a given input, we 
cannot conclude that the function is undefined for that input. The value of the function, for the particular 
input, may simply require a method of computation that is unique to the input. 
 
62 Formal arguments, including proofs, of the above consequences of a constructive interpretation of 
classical theory, are expressed in Anand [An02c]. 
 
 25
intuitionistically unobjectionable, interpretation of classical foundational concepts in 
which non-algorithmic truth is defined effectively. 
 In particular, we address the questions: 
(1) Are Platonism and Formalism incompatible doctrines? 
(2) Is mathematical truth verifiable effectively?  
(3) What is the significance of  Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem? 
(4) What is the significance of Turing's Halting Theorem?  
(5) Can all mental concepts be expressed mathematically? 
(6) Can a constructive interpretation of Peano Arithmetic model some of the more 
paradoxical concepts of Quantum Mechanics? 
II-1  Are Platonism and Formalism incompatible doctrines? 
Broadly reflecting the classical viewpoint: 
Platonism63: Platonism may be viewed as the belief that abstract mathematical 
concepts are objective mathematical realities that can be perceived in a manner 
analogous to sense perception. Known also as mathematical realism, such a 
philosophy holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. 
Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other 
intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same. 
                                               
63 These comments are based on the evolving, inter-active (yet, prima facie, astonishingly representative of 
standard classical theory), views on the Philosophy of Mathematics expressed in the open-source, on-line, 
encyclopedia Wikipedia [WiPM]. 
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Formalism: Formalism may be viewed as the belief that mathematical statements 
may be thought of as statements about the consequences of certain string 
manipulation rules in the investigation of formal axiom systems. A theorem is not an 
absolute truth, but a relative one: if you assign meaning  to the strings in such a way 
that the rules of the game become true (ie, true statements are assigned to the axioms 
and the rules of inference are truth-preserving), then you have to accept the theorem, 
or, rather, the interpretation you have given it must be a true statement. 
That the two doctrines are, generally, seen as incompatible is reflected in Gower’s 
remarks [Gw02]: 
The basic Platonist position is rather simple. Mathematical concepts have an objective 
existence independent of us, and a statement such as “2+2=4” is true because two 
plus two really does equal four. In other words, for a Platonist mathematical 
statements are pretty similar to statements such as “that cup is on the table” even if 
mathematical objects are less tangible than physical ones. ... 
Formalism is more or less the antithesis of Platonism. One can caricature it by saying 
that the formalist believes that mathematics is nothing but a few rules for replacing 
one system of meaningless symbols with another. If we start by writing down some 
axioms and deduce from them a theorem, then what we have done is correctly apply 
our replacement rules to the strings of symbols that represent the axioms and ended 
up with a string of symbols that represents the theorem. At the end of this process, 
what we know is not that the theorem is “true” or that some actually existing 
mathematical objects have a property of which we were previously unaware, but 
merely that a certain statement can be obtained from certain other statements by 
means of certain processes of manipulation. 
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That such apparent incompatibility may also have disconcerting, schizophrenic, 
undertones is reflected in the remark of a distinguished mathematician who, reportedly, 
described himself as a closet Platonist. On weekdays, when he was teaching 
(communicating to students), he lived in a world of formal structures; on weekends, when 
he was theorising (communing with himself), he lived in a world of Platonic ideals.  
Unconsciously echoing this sentiment, set-theorist Saharon Shelah, too, reflected, in a 
soliloquy [Sh91]: 
“Does this mean you are a formalist in spite of earlier indications that you are 
Platonist?” I am in my heart a card -carrying Platonist seeing before my eyes the 
universe of sets, but I cannot discard the independence phenomena. 
However, it can be argued, reasonably, that the philosophical paraphernalia carried by the 
two isms, Platonism and Formalism, may be largely irrelevant. The two may , simply, be 
complementary modes of thinking that we adopt, as convenient, to achieve our immediate 
purpose - the former as an aid to expression, the latter as an aid to communication.  
Moreover, in practice, an implicit acceptance that they are two sides of the same coin 
may not be uncommon, despite debates on the subject that sometimes seem to suggest 
otherwise. In other words, every mathematician could be considered both as a creative 
Platonist, and an academic Formalist. 
The question arises: Why, then, is there an unresolved debate on the issue?  
Let us digress a little into some speculation. The ability to externally express, in some 
form, its internal states, can be seen as the indication, if not the definition, of a life form. 
Similarly, the ability to communicate such expression, to other life forms, can be seen as 
the indication, if not the definition, of intelligent life forms.  
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On this view, natural selection would simply be the reward of life forms whose 
intelligence is synonymous with the effectiveness of their ability to communicate. Under 
such a thesis (i.e., natural selection), such life forms could, possibly, have a greater 
chance of adapting holistically; and of retaining, for a longer period, a comparatively 
larger measure of a dynamically evolving identity, in an environment that is inimical to 
the survival of any concept of a static identity. 
Viewed thus, the need, and ability, to express internal states externally could have a 
primordial significance that is rooted in the very ability of an evolutionary life form to 
survive, on the basis of instinctive reactions. In contrast, the need, and ability, to 
communicate effectively, would only be of significance consequently, in order to 
continuously evolve, and inter-act more harmoniously with its environment, through 
conscious action. 
Returning to mathematics, the parallel would be that appreciation of the significance, and 
need, for Platonic modes of thought - as essential to the expression of abstract 
mathematical concepts, which can be viewed as existing within individual gestalts - could 
be at a more advanced stage, than appreciation of the significance, and need, for 
Formalist modes of thought. The latter may be significant only in the subsequent 
communication of such expression - for the identification of, say, that which can be 
accepted as uniformly common to a collective of individual gestalts. 
So, one could, perhaps, say that Platonists, such as Gödel64 earlier, and Shelah and 
Penrose today, are simply arbitrating, with reference to their individual gestalts, which of 
                                               
64 Gödel’s Platonism was explicit, and is well-documented by him. For instance, he remarks [Go51]: 
 
“Moreover, exactly as in the natural sciences ... inductio per enumerationem simplicem is by no means the 
only inductive method conceivable in mathematics. I admit that every mathematician has an inborn 
abhorrence to giving more than heuristic significance to such inductive arguments. I think, however, that 
this is due to the very prejudice that mathematical objects somehow have no real existence. If mathematics 
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our mathematical propositions, when formally expressed in a precisely defined 
mathematical language, are intuitively true, and which are intuitively false, under their 
individual interpretations. 
By definition, such a view is, of course, unassailable. It may, moreover, be of value in 
understanding the cognitive processes of an individual brain, and of an individual mind.  
However, clearly, such a view addresses only one half of human intellectual endeavor. 
This half would, first, be the attempt to individually express the state of the static 
synaptic elements, of the dynamically-evolving neuronic activity that is taken to represent 
an individual brain, within a symbolic language. And, second, it would be the subsequent 
attempt, to individually interpret, and relate, the symbols of a language to an existing 
state of static synaptic elements, of the dynamically-evolving neuronic activity that is 
taken to represent the individual brain. 
The other half of human intellectual activity would, then, be that of determining which, 
of the concepts that are represented by such expressions, can be communicated uniformly 
in an unambiguous, and effective, manner that is independent of individual 
interpretations. 
Curiously, although this area of intellectual activity would seem, prima facie, to be the 
natural preserve of Formalism, this issue does not seem to have been addressed, 
classically, as vigorously as it deserves, for reasons that seem to have a lot to do with the 
influence of Gödel's interpretation of his own formal reasoning. 
                                                                                                                                            
describes an objective world just like physics, there is no reason why inductive methods should not be 
applied in mathematics just the same as in physics. The fact is that in mathemati cs we still have the same 
attitude today that in former times one had toward all science, namely, we try to derive everything by 
cogent proofs from the definitions (that is, in ontological terminology, from the essences of things). 
Perhaps this method, if it claims monopoly, is as wrong in mathematics as it was in physics.”  
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For instance, most post-Gödelian discussions, on the foundations of mathematics, 
predominantly concern themselves with the question of whether we can, and how best we 
may, capture abstract mathematical concepts within formal languages that, it is implicitly 
accepted, cannot be interpreted uniquely. 
Now, if we agree that abstract mathematical concepts may appear differently in different 
gestalts65, then human experience in the experimental, observational and engineering 
disciplines indicates that we can, indeed, communicate the formalisation of mathematical 
concepts in an unambiguous, and effective, manner.  
Prima facie, there is, thus, discordance between the theory and usage of mathematical 
languages. One would, reasonably, expect this to be an over-riding foundational concern 
of Formalism. This, however, does not seem to be the case at the moment. 
To the contrary, a significant limitation of classical interpretations, of the formal 
reasoning and conclusions of classical first order theory - based primarily on the work of 
not only Gödel, but also that of Cantor, Tarski, and Turing - is an implicit, even if 
sometimes uncomfortable, acceptance of the argument - based, again, on an implicitly 
Platonic interpretation of Tarski's Theorem  - that the truth of some propositions of a 
formal arithmetic, such as Peano Arithmetic, PA, under an interpretation M, is both non-
algorithmic and essentially unverifiable constructively. 
In other words, echoing Gödel's beliefs, it is accepted classically that PA cannot be taken 
as a faithful, and complete, formalisation of our intuitive, Dedekind, arithmetic; so, either 
(as standard interpretations of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions implicitly imply) such 
                                               
65 For instance, how would different individuals conceptualise a square circle? 
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arithmetic is not formalisable in principle, or there is some, yet undiscovered, arithmetic 
that formalises M more faithfully66. 
However, such a view tends to gloss over a philosophically disturbing issue. The former 
is, intuitively, an unappealing, and implicitly self -limiting, admission; the latter, an 
unacceptable reflection on the competence of mathematicians to adequately select an 
appropriate set of primitive, axiomatic, assertions for PA as may be needed for PA to be 
an effective, and unambiguous, mathematical language of precise communication.  
Now - since mathematics does serve increasingly as a language of precise expression and 
unambiguous communication for scientific discourse - a more reasonable thesis would be 
that such interpretations could, indeed, be balanced by an alternative, constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, interpretation of classical foundational concepts in 
which non-algorithmic truth is defined effectively67.  
                                               
66 For instance, Gödel remarks [Go51]: 
 
“However, as to subjective mathematics, it is not precluded that there should exist a finite rule producing 
all its evident axioms. However, if such a rule exists, ... we could never know with mathematical certainty 
that all propositions it produces are correct ... the assertion ... that they are all true could at most be known 
with empirical certainty ... there would exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems ..., where the 
epithet ‘absolutely’ means that they would be undecidable, not just within some particular axiomatic 
system, but by any mathematical proof the human mind can conceive.” 
 
67 In other words, we argue that not every effective method is necessarily algorithmic, although every 
algorithm is an effective method. The possibility that mathematical tru th may be non-algorithmic, and yet 
constructive, is implicit in Gödel [Go51]:  
 
“I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a universal proposition (for example, that I shall be 
able to verify a certain property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjecture that no general 
proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imagine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well 
founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case if the proposition in question were 
some equation F(n) = G(n) of two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very great 
numbers n”.  
 
The possibility is also implicit in Turing’s remarks ([ Tu36], §9, para II).  
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More precisely, it can be argued that some foundational concepts - implicitly accepted as 
intuitively unexceptionable in the classical interpretations of Cantor's, Gödel's, Tarski's 
and Turing's reasoning - can, under such thesis, be explicated effectively in non-Platonic 
interpretations that consider whether, and, if so, when and how, we may, within classical 
logic and without inviting inconsistency:  
* define a mathematical object formally; 
* define mathematical truth effectively:  
* define effective methods of numerical computation non-algorithmically; 
* differentiate between the concepts “Algorithmic truth: A formula F(x) of a 
language L is uniformly true under an interpretation M for all x in the domain of 
M” and “Non-algorithmic truth: A formula F(x) of a language L is individually 
true under an interpretation M for any given x in the domain of M”; 
* assert that two formulas of a formal system, under a given interpretation, have “the 
same meaning”. 
In other words, there may, arguably, be a need to free Formalism from the influence of an 
extended, post- Gödelian, Platonist philosophy - such as Realism. A need that arises 
from, and reflects, the failure of classical theory to distinguish between the 
representation, within a language, of those abstract concepts (mental constructs of an 
individual mind) that are individually significant within an individual gestalt, and th ose 
of these abstract concepts that are, further, communicable in an unambiguous and 
effective manner, and which may, therefore, be termed as uniformly significant within a 
collective of gestalts. 
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Prima facie, most of the challenges faced in unambiguously, and effectively, 
communicating mathematical concepts, seem to involve conclusions arrived at from 
debatable Realist premises68. Premises that, when introduced authoritatively into formal 
mathematical reasoning, and into scientific discourse, permit us to logically validate our 
subjective intuitive perceptions as being reflective of some absolute Truth that - contrary 
to our intuitive experience - must be of universal significance in a Utopian, Platonic 
world. 
We could even go further, and consider whether the relation of a particular language 
(whether mathematical or not), to that which the language seeks to express, should be the 
preserve of the philosophers of the language, and of those who study the nature of the 
mind and of consciousness - not of the logicians or mathematicians who simply provide 
the tools for such study. 
In other words, the selection of the alphabet, selection of rules for defining well-formed 
words, phrases, and declarative atomic and compound sentences, selection of primitive 
objects (constants) and primitive truths (axioms), selection of rules of deduction for 
assigning truth values to non-axioms, etc., in a language should be consequent to the 
adequate resolution of philosophical issues that consider the question of what we 
visualise as, and how we visualise, the properties and relations between elements of an 
abstract, Platonically conceived, ontology - in our individual gestalts - that a logician or 
mathematician is being asked to represent within a formal language.  
Whether the above properties and relations between elements of a chosen abstract, 
Platonically conceived, ontology have limited, individual significance, or have a wider, 
common significance, should also be the rightful preserve of philosophy in general, along 
                                               
68 For instance, that mathematical truth is discovered. 
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with questions concerning the nature of such elements, their properties, and their 
relationships. 
However, once we have defined a language, we should not be at liberty to use the rules of 
the language to deduce the existence of new, unique, elements of the ontology (as 
opposed to elements of the language) that are not explicitly specified by the definitions of 
the language. Such deduction would amount to a creation by extraneous definition that 
would contradict the premise that the language has already been specifically defined to 
express selected pre-conceived, Platonic, concepts. 
In other words, the aim of mathematics should not be to introduce such extraneous 
definitions into a language, but to study the consequences of a mathematical language 
that, beyond the considerations involved in its definition, are independent of the Platonic 
concepts that the language was designed to express. By this yardstick, standard 
interpretations of Cantor's diagonal argument 69, or of his power set theorem (as also of 
some of the transfinite elements of set theory) seem to extravagantly violate this 
principle. 
II-2 Is mathematical truth verifiable effectively? 
In a general talk, Gowers [Gw02] remarked that:  
If you ask a philosopher what the main problems are in the philosophy of 
mathematics, then the following two are likely to come up: what is the status of 
mathematical truth, and what is the nature of mathematical objects? That is, what 
                                               
69 We address some of the non-constructive issues involved in classical interpretations of Cantor’s diagonal 
argument in [An03b]. 
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gives mathematical statements their aura of infallibility, and what on earth are these 
statements about? 
Thus, even 70 years after Gödel’s seminal 1931 paper [Go31a], where he highlighted that 
there is an essential asymmetry between classically true, and classically provable, 
arithmetical propositions, the roots of such distinction continue, apparently, to elude 
effective expression. 
Now, prima facie, for any language to be termed as a language of unambiguous, and 
effective, communication, the truth of its propositions, under any interpretation, ought to 
be unambiguous, and effectively verifiable independently of the domain of the 
interpretation.  
We are, thus, faced with the questions: Is mathematical truth necessarily unverifiable 
effectively, and are there theoretically absolute limitations on unambiguous, and 
effective, communication? 
Now, following Gödel’s interpretation of his own reasoning, and conclusions, in his 1931 
paper [Go31a], standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory seem to 
implicitly imply that, even in a mathematical language as basic as formal Peano 
Arithmetic, the most fundamental of our70 intuitive mathematical concepts cannot be 
expressed, and communicated in a complete, unambiguous, and effective manner71. 
                                               
70 If we accept that an awareness of the concept of finite counting is also exhibited in the behaviour of other 
species, then the concept may be intuitively fundamental in a far larger sense.  
 
71 Which gives an unintended, and devilishly m isleading, twist to Russell’s (justly) famous quip [Rs01]: 
 
"Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor 
whether what we are saying is true."  
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The extent to which such interpretations are accepted as setting implicit, and, apparently 
absolute, limitations on unambiguous, and effective, communication, depends, no doubt, 
on individual psychological, and philosophical, predilections. Thus, although professional 
mathematicians and mathematical logicians  might succeed in placing such limitations in 
comfortably abstract, albeit counter-intuitive, perspective, such comfort may be denied to 
other disciplines that primarily need to express their fundamental concepts and 
observations in an unambiguous, and effectively communicable, manner. For instance, 
seekers of extra-terrestrial intelligence, or those striving to replicate human intelligence in 
controllable artifacts, could find such acceptance disturbingly constricting, and 
philosophically disquieting.  
In this essay, we suggest that such limitations are not absolute, but self-imposed. We 
argue that they are rooted in a removable ambiguity in the standard interpretations of 
Tarski’s, non-verifiably formulated, definitions of the satisfiability, and truth, of the 
formulas of a formal system, under a given interpretation (essentially, in an unspecified, 
and implicitly Platonic, domain). 
Now, a question of increasing interest to scientific disciplines that look to mathematics 
for providing a language of reliable, and verifiable, external expression and 
communication72, is: Are the concepts “non-algorithmic” and “non-constructive” 
necessarily synonymous in classical logic and mathematics? 
Gödel argues that, in a formal language as basic as Peano Arithmetic, there are 
undecidable sentences that can be recognised as true under classical interpretation, but 
                                               
72For most scientific disciplines, the authority of the standard interpretations of classical mathematics is 
seen, and accepted (perhaps with some element of reluctance, since such acceptance occasionally flies 
against the grain of observation and experience) not only as absolute, but also as implicitly promising 
sufficiency, when needed, to help bridge the seemingly unbridgeable chasm that sometimes confronts such 
disciplines - between a Platonic world of abstract objects, and the real world of sensory perceptions! 
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which are not provable within the system. Does this imply that such recognition, in some 
cases, cannot be duplicated in any artificially constructed and, more important, artificially 
controlled, mechanism or organism whose design is based on classical logic?73 
The scientific, and philosophical, dimensions of an affirmative answer to the last question 
have been broadly reviewed, and addressed, by Penrose in [Pe90] and [Pe94]. Penrose’s 
argument is based on a strongly Platonist thesis that sensory perceptions simply mirror 
aspects of a universe that exists, and will continue to exist, independent of any observer 
([Pe90], p123, p146)74. On this view, individual consciousness would be a discovery of 
what there is (cf. [Pe90], p124), and be independent of the language in which such 
discovery is expressed. It follows that recognition of intuitive truth would be individually 
asserted - and, implicitly, fallible - correlations between the unverifiable - and, ipso facto, 
infallible - intuitive experiences of an individual consciousness, and the formal 
expressions of a communicable language.  
The issue, then, is whether classical logic can adequately formalise intuitive truth to make 
it infallible, or whether such recognition is essentially fallible75. Penrose opts for the 
inadequacy of classical logic to completely capture a Platonic mathematical reality that, 
he believes, manifests itself, first, in thought - which originates in the mind consequent to 
sensory experience - and, second, in its representation in a communicable language. He 
supports his view by highlighting the “ethereal” presence, and non-verifiable properties, 
                                               
73 We note that the question may have economic significance globally, particularly in areas relating to the 
development of strategic and infra-structural products, facilities and services that are based on the proposed 
replication of human intelligence by artificial mechanisms or organisms.  
 
74 An obvious, but arguably relevant, objection to this argument is that it assumes multiple, spatially 
separated, observers can each, Deity-like, acquire identical knowledge of a Universe simultaneously 
without altering, or even indirectly influencing, the knowledge that is sought to be acquired. 
 
75 Of course, there is an inescapable element of circularity in considering the fallibility of assertions that are 
asserted as intuitively true.  
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of various non-algorithmic ([Pe90], p168), and implicitly non-constructive, mathematical 
concepts that are accepted in our formal languages as essential to classical mathematics 
([Pe90], p123-8). 
Although Penrose’s arguments represent only one, and perhaps an arguably extreme, 
point of view76, they emphasise that classical mathematics may yet need to adequately 
legitimise the acceptance, into a theory, of formally definable mathematical objects (cf. 
[Pe90], p147), most obviously those that can be argued as being essentially non-
constructive.  
Now we note that Penrose appears to base his thesis on, amongst others, a classical 
consequence of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions:  
We cannot express Tarskian definitions  of the “satisfiability” and “truth” of formal 
expressions under an interpretation algorithmically ([Pe90], p159). 
This is, essentially, an intuitiv e interpretation of:  
Tarski’s Theorem: The set Tr of Gödel-numbers of the formal expressions of a first 
order Peano Arithmetic that are true in the standard model is not arithmetical. In other 
words, there is no formula [F(x)] in any formal Peano Arithmetic such that Tr is the 
set of numbers k for which [F(k)] is true in the standard model. 
Penrose concludes that, although we may follow a common intuitive process for 
discovering common mathematical aspects of the universe, not all our mathematically 
expressible discoveries are expressible by classical algorithms ([Pe90], p533, p548).  
                                               
76 See Psyche, Vol. 2(9), June 1995, Symposium on Roger Penrose's Shadows of the Mind. 
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However, Penrose’s arguments also appear to imply further, albeit implicitly, that our 
recognition of intuitive “arithmetical truth” - even when this is accepted as being 
adequately formalised by the classical Tarskian definitions  of the “satisfiability” and 
“truth” of formal expressions under an interpretation - is “absolutely” non-constructive 
(cf. [Pe90], p145-6). 
Thus, although Penrose does not seem to question the mathematical form of Church’s 
Thesis ([Pe90], p64-65) - which, essentially, postulates that every effectively computable 
function is algorithmic - he seems to conclude from his arguments, concerning the 
inadequacy of classical logic, that there may be non-algorithmic, non-constructive, ways 
of acquiring mathematical insight and knowledge ( [Pe90], p538)77.  
As is evidenced in his discussion of Lucas’ Gödelian argument 78 [Lu61], Penrose does 
not appear ([Pe90], p539) to entertain the possibility that there may be non-algorithmic 
reasoning that could be intuitionistically accepted as constructive; his arguments seem to, 
implicitly, treat the terms “non-algorithmic” and “non-constructive” as synonymous79. 
                                               
77 Penrose’s belief, that non-algorithmic effective methods are necessarily non-constructive in classical 
mathematics, may, however, be reflective of the thinking amongst a wide set of scientific disciplines, as 
seen in Gurney's remarks [ Gu96], (reproduced in §II-5), in the context of neural nets. 
 
78 “Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained 
as machines.” 
 
79 Davis [Da90] critically reviews this particular aspect of Penrose’s argument. He argu es that: "... Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem (in a strengthened form based on work of J.B. Rosser as well as the solution of 
Hilbert's tenth problem) may be stated as follows: There is an algorithm which, given any consistent set of 
axioms, will output a polynomial equation P = 0 which in fact has no integer solutions, but such that this 
fact can not be deduced from the given axioms. Here then is the true but unprovable Gödel sentence on 
which Penrose relies and in a particularly simple form at that. Note that the sentence is provided by an 
algorithm. If insight is involved, it must be in convincing oneself that the given axioms are indeed 
consistent, since otherwise we will have no reason to believe that the Gödel sentence is true".  
 
However, the real issue is not whether there is an algorithm that outputs P = 0, but whether, for any given 
set of natural number values for its free variables, the fact that P = 0 has no integer solutions can be 
determined in a non-algorithmic, yet constructive way.  
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However, what Penrose, for instance, views as the essentially, and absolutely non-
constructive, aspects of mathematical concepts, may simply be manifestations of a 
removable ambiguity in the classical Tarskian definitions  of the satisfiability, and truth, 
of our formal expressions under an interpretation. 
In other words, we may simply need to: 
(i) first, remove possible ambiguities in Tarski's definitions  by explicitly introducing 
the concept of effective verification into Tarski's definitions , and,  
(ii) second, explicitly specify when a method of verification can be considered 
effective by re-formulating Church's Thesis . 
An interesting consequence, and raison d’etre, of such an alternative, constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, interpretation of Gödel's reasoning, and of Tarski's 
definitions of satisfiability and truth, is that Peano Arithmetic can, then, be shown to be 
complete, albeit in a broader sense than that in which the term is defined classically. 
Thus, we could consider a language verifiably complete if, and only if, every true 
statement of the language is effectively verifiable under definitions such as, say, the 
following: 
(a) Individual truth: A formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is individually true 
under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k in M, there is 
an individually effective method (which may depend on the value k) to 
determine that the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(b) Uniform truth: A formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is uniformly true under 
an interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method 
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(necessarily independent of x) such that, given any value k in M, it can 
determine that the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(c) Effective truth: A formula [F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively true under 
an interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either individually true in M, or it is 
uniformly true in M. 
We note that, if we eliminate the references to effective methods in the above, we arrive 
at Tarski's corresponding definitions  of the truth of formal propositions under an 
interpretation (cf. [Me64], p49-52). However, clearly, these would no longer be able to 
distinguish between individual truth (satisfiability), and uniform truth (satisfiability), as 
suggested above. 
Now, Gödel argues that, in any consistent, formal, system P that formulates Peano’s 
Arithmetic, we can construct a valid expression of the system, say [R(x)], such that 
[R(n)] is P-provable for any given numeral [n], but [(Ax)R(x)] is not P-provable. The 
classical interpretation of this is that although [(Ax)R(x)] is not P-provable, it is true 
under its standard interpretation by Tarski’s definitions of satisfiability and truth. 
However, by implications that can be considered as implicit in Tarski’s definitions , 
[R(n)] may be viewed alternatively as an expression whose standard interpretation, R(n), 
can be effectively asserted as holding individually - and not necessarily algorithmically - 
for any given natural number n, but R(x) cannot be effectively asserted as holding 
uniformly - in the sense of algorithmically - for all natural numbers x collectively. 
In other words, the classical interpretations of Tarski’s definitions of satisfiability  and 
truth seem to contain an ambiguity: they implicitly imply the existence of an ambiguous 
effective method for deciding whether formal expressions such as [R(x)] are satisfied 
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under a given interpretation. Specifically, they fail to entertain the possibility that such a 
method may be non-algorithmic.  
Thus, for any given value n of its free variable under a given interpretation, there may 
always be a - possibly n-specific - (hence non-algorithmic) method that can effectively 
decide whether the interpretation R(n) of a formal expression such as [R(n)] holds 
individually, even when there is no n-independent (algorithmic) effective method  that 
can effectively decide whether the expression [R(x)] is satisfied uniformly, under a given 
interpretation, when we substitute any numeral [n] for its free variable. 
The ambiguity in Tarski's definitions  is reflected in reasoning such as:  
[(Ex)F(x)] is provable in Peano Arithmetic. Hence, we can conclude the existence of 
some, unspecified, natural number s such that [F(s)] is provable in PA, and use [F(s)] 
as a provable assertion in formal arguments. 
Now, even if we accept the classical Tarskian definitions of the satisfiability and truth  of 
number-theoretic assertions as definitive, a reasonable interpretation of “[(Ax)F(x)] is 
provable in PA” could be an inductive one. In other words we could still interpret it as the 
assertion that there is some uniformly effective method, independent of x, of determining 
that, given any natural number s, [F(s)] is provable in PA. 
It follows that “[(Ex)F(x)] is provable in PA”, which is defined as “[~(Ax)~F(x)] is 
provable in PA”, would then be the assertion that there is no uniformly effective method, 
independent of x, of determining that, given any natural number s, [~F(s)] is provable in 
PA. 
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However, for any given s, there may yet be some individual effective method, which 
depends on s, such that [~F(s)] is provable in PA80. Can we, therefore, validly conclude - 
even classically - that [F(s)] is necessarily provable in PA for some s?  
Leaving the question unaddressed tacitly tolerates extravagant existential interpretations 
in classical theory. Thus, as Christer-Hennix notes [He04]: 
“...in 1959, A. Heyting characterized, not without chagrin, the development after 
1931, at the Warsaw Conference, with the following words: 
The danger to which I alluded just now, namely that a notion which was meant to 
be constructive, is afterwards interpreted in a non-constructive way, is not 
imaginary; on the contrary, several meta -mathematical notions have suffered by 
it. In general, those mathematicians who introduce the non-constructive 
interpretation, are not aware that they falsify the notion as it was originally 
intended. 
Further, ignoring the issue also seems to obscure the raison d'etre of a mathematical 
language - to communicate unambiguously, and effectively. Thus, if mathematics is to 
serve both as a language that expresses all possible abstract (including Platonic) 
mathematical concepts in formal languages, and also to serve as a language of precise 
expression and unambiguous communication, then, particularly in the latter case, we may 
need to specify effective decision procedures for determining whether, or not, a 
proposition of a formal language of mathematical communication, L, is to be termed as 
true or not under each given interpretation M. 
                                               
80 This possibility, prima facie, admits (without rejecting the Law of the Excluded Middle) Brouwer’s, and 
the intuitionist, objection to the general validity of putative instantiations that are concluded, classically, 
from interpretations of the existential theorems of a formal system. 
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For instance, similar to the familiar Chur ch Thesis (that we may treat a number-theoretic 
function as effectively computable if, and only if, it is recursive) we may need to specify 
when, and only when, we can treat the truth of a number-theoretic relation as effectively 
decidable. The Individual and Uniform Church Theses, defined above in §I-5, could, 
indeed, serve as possible paths towards such an end. 
II-3 What is the significance of Gödel's First Incompleteness 
Theorem? 
If we define satisfiability and truth effectively as suggested earlier, it turns out that, by 
Gödel's reasoning, every system of Peano Arithmetic is omega-inconsistent (see the 
definition below), and so Gödel's Theorem VI (the famous First Incompleteness Theorem 
of his seminal 1931 paper [Go31a]) holds vacuously.  
To see this, consider Gödel's recursive relation Q(x, p), which is represented in P by 
[R(x, p)], where [(Ax)R(x, p)] is Gödel's “undecidable” proposition. Thus, although we 
can effectively conclude, from Gödel's reasoning in the first part of his proof of Theorem 
VI, that “Q(n, p) holds individually for any given natural number n”, we cannot, prima 
facie, assume that this is equivalent to the non-constructive, infinite, compound, sentence 
“Q(x, p) holds uniformly for all natural numbers x”. 
The distinction between the two assertions may be better expressed in terms of classical 
Turing machines. Thus, given any natural number n, it follows - from Gödel’s reasoning 
that [R(n, p)] is P-provable - that there is always some effective method that will 
terminate in a finite, even if indeterminate, number of steps t(n) if, and only if, R(n, p) 
holds.  
However, since [(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-provable, there may not be any Turing machine 
such that, given any n, it will halt in a determinate number of steps, t(n), if, and only if, 
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R(n, p) holds . In other words, there may be no classical Turing machine that computes 
the function t(x); in Turing's terminology, t(x) may be Turing-uncomputable, even 
though t(n) is effectively computable for any given n. Thus, a constructive interpretation 
of Gödel's reasoning implies that the Turing thesis  is false. 
Now, the thesis of a constructive interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions is 
that we may not interpret, for instance, the meta-assertion “PA proves: [(Ax)F(x)] ” as 
the non-verifiable, Tarskian meta -assertion: 
F(x) is satisfied by any given element x of the domain of M . 
We must interpret it, instead, as the verifiable meta -assertion: 
There is a uniformly effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) such that, given 
any element x of the domain of M, it will effectively decide that F(x) is satisfied in 
M.  
It follows that both the meta-assertions, “PA does not prove [(Ax)F(x)]”, and “PA proves 
[~(Ax)F(x)]”, then interpret constructively as the meta-assertion: 
There is no uniformly effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) such that, given 
any element x of M, it will effectively decide that F(x) is satisfied in M. 
Consequently, a constructive interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions implies 
that there can be no undecidable propositions in PA; in other words, that PA is complete 
in the sense that the truth of any arithmetical proposition is effectively, i.e., either 
individually, or uniformly, verifiable in PA. 
However, we are, then, immediately faced with the question: Since the standard 
interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions asserts that PA is classically 
incomplete, how definitive is the standard interpretation? 
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Now, in Theorem VI of his 1931 paper, Gödel essentially argues that his “undecidable” 
proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], is such that: 
If [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, then [~R(n)] is PA-provable for some numeral [n]. 
Now, by standard logical axioms, we have that: 
If [~R(n)] is PA-provable for some numeral [n], then [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
It thus follows that Gödel has, essentially, argued that: 
If [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, then [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
Clearly, it should now follow, by the standard Deduction Theorem of first order logic, 
that: 
[(Ax)R(x) => ~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, 
and so: 
[~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
However, at this point, standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning appeal to his explicit 
assumption that PA is omega-consistent81 in order to conclude that the PA-provability of 
[~(Ax)R(x)] cannot be inferred from the above meta-argument.  
Omega-consistency: A formal system P is omega -consistent if, and only if, there is 
no P-provable formula [~F(x)] such that [F(s)] is P-provable for any given numeral 
[s]. 
                                               
81 The concept of omega-consistency was introduced by Gödel ([Go31a], p23-24). Although Gödel's 
reasoning was specific to his formal system P, he noted that it could be replicated equally within other 
formal systems of Set Theory, such as ZFC, and Peano Arithmetics, such as standard PA. 
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Now, unless the omega-consistency of PA has some deeper, intuitive significance 
philosophically, this is not a reasonable inference. Since the Deduction Theorem is a 
fundamental theorem of classical logic, we must, using Occam’s razor, conclude from 
Gödel's reasoning, first, that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, and, second, that PA is omega-
inconsistent - and so Gödel's Theorem VI holds vacuously82! 
Now we note that the omega-inconsistency of PA is, actually, natural, and intuitively 
unobjectionable, under a constructive interpretation of the concept of “PA proves: 
[(Ax)F(x)]” as described earlier.  
Under such interpretation, an omega-inconsistent PA does not imply that PA, or any of its 
interpretations, are either inconsistent, or unnaturally consistent; it simply implies that 
there are arithmetical relations that cannot be verified uniformly by any effective method 
(algorithm / Turing machine) over the domain of their interpretation.  
The above suggests that it may be the absence of an adequately technical counter-
argument that leaves Wittgenstein’s viewpoint [ Wi78] - and, possibly, that of others who 
have shared his reservations and misgivings, such as the ultra -intuitionist Yessenin-
Volpin today (cf. [He04]) - vulnerable to the arguments advanced by classical 
interpretations of Gödel's reasoning and conclusion; the latter, implicitly, imply that any 
interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusion must be accepted as essentially 
counter-intuitive on the basis of purely technical considerations. 
Prima facie, the classical interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions seems 
strengthened by Rosser’s argument that Gödelian undecidability can be established in a 
                                               
82 This argument is considered in detail in the web essays [An02b] and [An03i]. We note that some of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks (cf. [ An03h]) indicate that, prima facie, he, too, saw no intuitively signif icant 
philosophical grounds for treating the omega-consistency of Peano Arithmetic as a primitive concept, and 
for allowing it to over-ride an application of the Deduction Theorem. 
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simply consistent PA without assuming omega-consistency. However, if a standard (text-
book) exposition of Rosser’s proof, such as in Mendelson [Me64], can be accepted as 
definitive, then Rosser’s argument may be non-constructive, and intuitionistically 
objectionable83. 
                                               
83 See [An02a] for a detailed analysis of Rosser’s argument. Briefly, Rosser’s informal meta -argument 
seems to be that, assuming [H] is a provable PA-formula, and that j is the Gödel-number of a proof of [H] 
in PA, and given that:  
 
(i) PA proves: [H] => PA proves: [q(j)], 
 
where [q(y)] is also a PA-formula, we may conclude, by the Deduction Theorem, that: 
 
(ii) PA proves: [H] => [q(j)]. 
 
However, such reasoning is invalid, since ( ii) may not be a theorem of PA.  
 
To see this, note that, given any natural number h, we could construct a Turing-machine that would 
decompose h to check whether it is in fact the Gödel-number of some well-formed formula [H] of PA. 
Then, assuming the provability of [H], the program would conclude that the meta-assertion (ii) is invalid, 
since it does not hold for every natural number j. 
 
In other words, the formal meta-mathematical expression of (i) is, actually, the meta-statement: 
 
(iii) PA proves: [H] => (Ej)PA proves: [q(j)]. 
 
Now, from this, we cannot conclude (as Rosser does) that: 
 
(iv) PA proves: [H] => PA proves: [(Ej)q(j)]. 
 
Thus, from (iii), we may only conclude that, under the standard interpretation, it is true there must be the 
number j. However, for j to be introduced as a symbol into a formal PA-proof, as in Rosser's arguments ( i) 
and (ii), where he applies the Deduction Theorem, we also need a formal PA-proof that the number j does 
exist in every interpretation. However, [(Ej)q(j)] may be PA-unprovable. 
 
In other words, if j is Turing uncomputable, then j cannot be constructively defined by any PA-formula, 
and so the Deduction Theorem cannot be applied to the formal meta-assertion (iii), to conclude (ii) within a 
formal proof sequence of PA, so as to yield Rosser’s undecidable proposition RUS in PA. Of course, PA 
proves: [q(j)] would follow from standard logical axioms if it could be shown that [(E!j)q(j)] is PA-
provable (where "!" signifies uniqueness).  
 
Now Rosser's argument implicitly assumes that j is always Turing -computable (hence there is always a PA-
formula that uniquely represents j), and arrives at a contradiction. However, this only establishes that j is 
Turing -uncomputable. In the absence of a PA-proof of (iv), we cannot logically conclude from this, as he 
seems to do, that there is no such j. 
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II-4 What is the significance of Turing's Halting Theorem? 
Consider the following form of the Halting Theorem: 
Theorem 1: There is no Turing machine WillHalt which, given an input string M+ w, 
will halt and accept the string if Turing machine M halts on input w, and will halt and 
reject the string if Turing machine M does not halt on input w, where, viewed as a 
Boolean function, WillHalt(M, w) (halts and) returns true in the first case, and (halts 
and) returns false in the second. 
Proof: Assuming that WillHalt(M, w) exists leads to an immediate contradiction. 
However, the above does not address an implicit, and foundationally fundamental, non-
constructive issue: What, precisely, do we mean by “M does not halt on input w”?  
If WillHalt(M, w) could effectively determine somehow that M does not halt on input w, 
then this procedure could be built into M, and so M would halt on w (possibly with the 
perplexing annotation: “Sorry, this program is being halted as the program has 
determined that it does not halt!”). Thus, we cannot even define the machine WillHalt(M, 
w) as a Turing machine without inviting an immediate inconsistency 84! 
So, if we accept that WillHalt(M, w) is a well-defined Boolean function, then the 
significant conclusion from the above (and Turing's) argument is not that WillHalt(M, w) 
is Turing -uncomputable, since we cannot define a Turing machine WillHalt, but that, if 
the function is effectively computable, then the Turing Thesis  is false. 
                                               
84 Prima facie, such definitions appear similar to that of a Liar proposition as “The Liar proposition is a 
lie”, or that of a Russell set as {x | x is a member of the Russell set if and only x is not a member of x}! 
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Now, in his 1936 paper [Tu36], Turing did not conclude from his Halting argument that a 
function such as WillHalt(M, w) is not computable; he only concluded that such a 
function cannot be computed by a Logical Computing (Turing) Machine as defined by 
him. However, since he was of the view that effective computability was, indeed, 
equivalent to computability by an LCM, Turing later proposed that a function such as 
WillHalt could, perhaps, be defined as an “oracle” that is not necessarily either 
deterministic or mechanical.  
As noted by Hodges [Ho00]: 
Turing's 1938 Princeton Ph.D. thesis, work conducted in close cooperation with 
Church, was entitled Systems of logic defined by ordinals, and published as (Turing 
1939). Predominantly the work consisted of highly technical developments within 
mathematical logic. However the driving force lay in the question: wha t is the 
consequence of supplementing a formal system with uncomputable deductive steps? 
In pursuit of this question, Turing introduced the definition of an “oracle” which can 
supply on demand the answer to the halting problem for every Turing machine. ... 
Turing defined the “oracle” purely mathematically as an uncomputable function, and 
said, ‘We shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle apart from saying that 
it cannot be a machine.’ The essential point of the oracle is that it performs non-
mechanical steps. 
Clearly, if the Turing Thesis  is false, then WillHalt can be a machine; further, if WillHalt 
is effectively computable, then Turing’s Thesis  is false. So, the point to consider is 
whether there are mechanical computational processes that are not obviously duplicatable 
by the operations of a classical Turing machine. 
Now, we can design a mechanical computer that will recognise a “looping” situation; it 
simply records every instantaneous tape description at the execution of each machine 
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instruction, and compares the current instantaneous tape description with the record (we 
may visualise this as the provision of a deterministic oracle, in the form of a virtual 
teleprinter, with an interrupt facility). We could then instruct the machine to assign 
arbitrary values to those undefined instances of WillHalt(M, w) whose occurrences cause 
the machine to loop. 
Clearly, if we can show, or accept, that the extended WillHalt(M, w) is well-defined, then 
Turing’s Thesis  is false. For instance, consider the following: 
Theorem 2: The Uniform Church Thesis  implies that the Halting problem is 
effectively solvable. 
Proof: If a number -theoretic function F(x) is Turing -computable, then it is partial 
recursive ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13). We may thus assume that F is obtained 
from a recursive function G by means of the unrestricted mu-operator; in other words, 
that F(x) = muy(G(x, y) = 0) ([Me64], p214). 
If, now, [H(x, y)] expresses ~(G(x, y) = 0) in a formal system of Peano Arithmetic 
such as standard PA, we then consider the PA-provability, and truth in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, of the formula [H(a, y)] for a given numeral [ a] of PA. 
We consider the argument:  
(a) Let Q1 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is not effectively true in M. Hence 
there is no effective method in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y 
satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. It follows that there is no uniformly effective 
method (Turing machine) in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies 
[H(a, y)] classically. 
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Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that any 
Turing machine T1(y) that computes the recursive function G(a, y) will halt and 
return the value 0 for y = k. 
(b) Next, let Q2 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, but that there is no uniformly effective method in M to 
determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. 
Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that any Turing machine T2(y) that computes 
the arithmetical function H(a, y) will halt, and return the symbol for self-
termination (looping) for some value y = k. 
(c) Finally, let Q3 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the 
standard interpretation M of PA, and that there is a uniformly effective method in 
M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. We 
then have that that [H(a, y)] is uniformly true in the standard interpretation M of 
PA. 
Now, if we assume a Uniform Church Thesis , then [H(a, y)] is PA-provable 
(since PA is, then, uniformly complete). Let h be the Gödel-number of [H(a, y)]. 
We consider, then, Gödel's primitive recursive number-theoretic relation xBy85, 
which holds in M if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence in PA 
for the PA-formula whose Gödel-number is y. It follows that there is some finite 
k such that any Turing machine T3(y), which computes the characteristic function 
of xBh, will halt and return the value 0 for x = k. 
                                               
85 See footnote in Appendix, 1. Notation. 
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Since Q1, Q2, and Q3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it follows that, when 
run simultaneously over the sequence 1, 2, 3, ... of values for y, one of T1(y) / 
T2(y) / T3(y) will always halt for some finite value of y. 
Thus, the halting problem is effectively solvable if we assume a Uniform Church Thesis . 
It, would then, also follow, first, that the parallel trio of Turing machines {T1(y), T2(y), 
T3(y)} is not a Turing machine; and, second, that the Turing thesis  is false! 
II-5 Can all mental concepts be expressed mathematically? 
5.1  What is mathematics? 
Without attempting to address the issue in its broader dimensions, we may, without any 
loss of generality, consider mathematics simply as a set of precise, symbolic, languages.  
Any language of such a set, say Peano Arithmetic PA  (or Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica, PM, or ZFC), is intended to express - in a finite, unambiguous, 
and communicable manner - relations between concepts that are external to the language 
PA (or to PM, or to ZFC). Each such language is, thus, in a Platonic sense, two-valued, if 
we assume that a relation either holds or does not hold externally (relative to the 
language).  
Further, a selected, finite, number of primitive formal assertions about a finite set of 
selected primitive relations of, say, a language L are defined as axiomatically L -provable; 
all other assertions about relations that can be effectively defined in terms of the primitive 
relations are termed as L-provable if, and only if, there is a finite sequence of assertions 
of L, each of which is either a primitive assertion, or which can effectively be determined 
in a finite number of steps as an immediate consequence of any two assertions preceding 
it in the sequence by a finite set of rules of consequence. 
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An effective interpretation of a language L into another language, say PM (or PA, or 
ZFC, or English, etc.), is essentially the specification of an effective method by which 
any assertion of L is translated unambiguously into a unique assertion of PM (or PA, or 
ZFC, or English, etc.). Clearly, if a relation is provable in L, then it should be effectively 
decidable in any interpretation of L that shares a common logic - since a finite proof 
sequence of L would, prima facie, translate as a finite proof sequence in the 
interpretation. 
The question arises: Is the converse true? In other words, if an assertion is decidable in an 
interpretation M of L, then does such decidability translate into an effective method of 
decidability in L? 
Obviously, such a question can only be addressed unambiguously if there is an effective 
method for determining whether an assertion is decidable in M. If there is no such 
effective method, then we are faced with the following thesis: 
Thesis: If there is no effective method for the unambiguous decidability of the 
assertions of a mathematical language L under an interpretation M, then L can only 
be considered a mathematical language of intuitive expression,  but not a 
mathematical language of effective, and unambiguous, communication.  
What this means is that, in the absence of an effective method of decidability in a 
mathematical language M that is a model of, say, a mathematical language such as PA, 
any correlation of soundness86 between a PA-assertion and an assertion in M is essentially 
arguable; so it is meaningless to ask whether, in general, an assertion of PA is decidable 
                                               
86 A formal language is, classically, said to be sound with respect to a given logic if every provable 
proposition of the language translates as a true sentence under any interpretation that shares the logic. The 
reverse condition is, classically, called completeness. (cf. also [WiSD]). 
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under interpretation in M or not (the question of whether the assertion is decidable in PA 
or not is, then, an issue of secondary consequence). 
Our original question can, thus, be rephrased as: 
Can the Mind be considered as the standard - albeit intuitive - model M of PA, with 
the brain as its domain, and can PA be considered a formalisation of the Mind? 
The first part of the question can, of course, be easily answered affirmatively, since every 
proof sequence of PA can, intuitively, be recognised by, and thus be seen as an effective 
method of decidability in, M. 
The second part, on the other hand, can be answered negatively just as easily, if we 
accept that the Mind can be seen to experience hallucinations (reflecting synaptic patterns 
that, by definition, we assume correspond to some aspects of the physical state of the 
brain) that cannot conceivably be effectively verified in any formal language.  
However, if we adopt the Individual and Uniform Church Theses §I-5(vii)-(viii) above, 
then every individually effective method, and every uniformly effective method of 
decidability, or computability, in the Mind corresponds to some effective method of 
decidability, or computability, in the language that is used to describe the Mind. 
It follows that, if any two interpretations of such a language are isomorphic (as indicated 
in §I-6(xiv) above), then the language can, in a sense, be taken as adequately formalising 
that part of the activity of the brain that lends itself to mathematical representation. 
5.2  Knowledge and intuitive truth 
The alternative consequences of Godel’s reasoning discussed in these essays draw 
significantly upon the way we choose to perceive the nature of Intuitive Knowledge, and 
more particularly the nature of factual, or intuitive truth.  
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By Intuitive Knowledge we refer loosely to that body of pro-active knowledge that stems 
directly from our conscious states, in contrast to our reactive Instinctive Knowledge, 
which stems from, and lies within, our sub-conscious and unconscious states. 
These essays are intended to highlight the wider significance of an issue that may 
otherwise lie in obscurity due to the specialised nature of the subject - that the influence, 
on our current modes of thought, of the interpretations, and conclusions, drawn from 
Gödel’s original paper [Go31a] may have a wider, multi-disciplinary, element that is not 
obvious from an appreciation of its purely logical and mathematical import. 
5.3  Implicit influence of Gödel’s Platonism 
The roots of this influence may be traced to implicitly Platonistic elements that underlie 
classical first order Peano Arithmetic, PA, which is based essentially on the formal 
system P defined by Gödel in his paper [Go31a]. Loosely speaking Gödel, who was an 
explicitly strong Platonist, assumed the existence of a world of ideals that could 
objectively be referred to for arbitrating which of our assumptions or premises, when 
formally expressed in a rigorously constructed scientific language, were intuitively true, 
and which were intuitively false, under any given interpretation. 
Now one may, when attempting to express mental concepts within a language, argue 
reasonably - as Gödel does - in Platonistic terms, and define intuitive truths as 
characteristics of relationships that are assumed to exist in some absolute sense (that is, 
even in the absence of any perceiver) between the objects of an external ontology (both 
of which are also taken to exist in some absolute sense).  
We argue, however, that, for effective communication, we may need an alternative view 
of relationships as belonging to individual perceptions that we consciously construct, and 
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selectively assign, to abstract objects (that themselves are individual conceptual 
constructs) of an abstract ontology (that is similarly an individual conceptual construct). 
In other words, each individual perception can, reasonably, be assumed to be a 
subjective, abstract, construct, based on a unique, one-of-a-kind, never-to-be-repeated, 
consciousness of an individual experience. An intuitive truth is, then, essentially, a 
constructed, space-time localised, individual factual truth (we shall, henceforth, use the 
terms synonymously). It corresponds to a subjectively constructed characteristic of the 
expression of an individual perception. Loosely speaking, it corresponds to a 
characteristic of the way we construct an expression for that which we select as common 
to a series of subjective perceptions, rather than to a characteristic that we discover of an 
objectively observed something. 
The distinction seems significant. Platonic concepts, when introduced into the 
interpretations of a formal language of communication, could permit us to misleadingly 
validate our subjective intuitive perceptions of individual factual truth as being reflective 
of some absolute Truth that must be of universal significance in a Utopian, Platonistic 
world. The Biblical Tower of Babel can, arguably, be seen as illustrating the extreme 
possibilities of such Platonistic beliefs. 
5.4  Formal algorithmic and non-algorithmic truth 
Now, a constructive interpretation of Gödel's Theorems is that they actually establish the 
effectiveness of our ability to also communicate abstractions that we intellectually 
conceive as non-algorithmic 87, on the basis of our individual sensory perceptions. They 
                                               
87 We contrast this with a classical interpretation of Gödel's Theorems such as is reflected in Davis’ remark 
[Da90], “There is certainly room for disagreement about whether the processes by which mathematical (or 
physical) theories are developed and accepted are algorithmic. But Gödel's theorem has nothing decisive to 
contribute to the discussion.” 
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thus have to do with the efficiency and effectiveness of our language of communication, 
and involve the concept of logical, or formal, truth (we treat the two terms as 
synonymous). 
We argue that, in formal languages, a selected set of axiomatic truths i s expressed as a set 
of Axioms (or Axiom schemas). The selection criteria is that the Axioms are readily 
accepted by any perceiver as faithfully reflecting some significant factual truths, 
pertaining to the expression of abstract constructed elements of the constructed ontology 
under consideration, as perceived and conceived by the perceiver. 
For the most basic, and intuitive, of our scientific languages, namely Number Theory or 
our Arithmetic of the natural numbers, we take the commonly accepted selection of such 
axiomatic truths as the classical set of Peano's Postulates, first expressed in semi -
axiomatic format by Dedekind in 1901. 
The challenge, then, is to express these in a formal language such as Peano Arithmetic, 
PA, along with a suitable set of Rules of Inference by which we can assign unique formal 
truth-values algorithmically to as many well-formed propositions of the theory as 
possible that are not Axioms.  
The concept of formal algorithmic truths is, thus, merely the result of the application of a 
set of Rules of Inference for effectively assigning such formal truth-values 
algorithmically to various logical permutations and combinations of axiomatic truths as 
(finite and infinite) compound assertions (which, ideally, should not introduce any new 
axiomatic truths that are not already implicit within the Axioms).  
Now, Tarski’s Theorem , based on Gödel’s remarkable reasoning [Go31a], is that, in any 
such system of Arithmetic, there are also formal truths that cannot be verified 
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algorithmically. In other words, there are formal non-algorithmic truths that are 
consequences of the axiom system, but which can only be verified non-algorithmically.  
By choosing to adopt Tarski's definitions of satisfiability and truth without effective 
verifiability, classical interpretations of formal, non-algorithmic, truth, hold that such 
truth is a property of the interpretation of a language, and so it cannot be contained within 
the language. 
The limiting consequences of such interpretations on the beliefs of other disciplines, 
which look to mathematics for providing them with languages for the pr ecise expression, 
and unambiguous communication, of scientific concepts, is seen in Gurney's following 
remarks [Gu96], in the context of neural nets: 
“... contemporary ‘AI engines’ are still vehicles for the instantiation of the theoretic 
stance which claims that cognition can be described completely as a process of 
formal, algorithmic symbol manipulation. ...  
AI has not fulfilled much of the early promise that was conjectured by the pioneers in 
the field. ... Principal among these are the belief that all knowledge or information can 
be formalised, and that the mind can be viewed as a device that operates on 
information according to formal rules. It is precisely in those domains of experience 
where it has proved extremely difficult to formalise the environment, that the ‘brittle’ 
rule-based procedures of AI have failed.  
The differentiation of knowledge into that which can be treated formally and that 
which cannot ... makes the distinction between cultural, or public knowledge and 
private, or intuitive knowledge. The stereotypical examples of the former are found in 
science and mathematics, whereas the latter describes, for instance, the skills of a 
native speaker or the intuitive knowledge of an expert in some field. In the 
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connectionist view, intuitive knowledge cannot be captured in a set of linguistically 
formalized rules and a completely different strategy must be adopted.”  
In these essays, we argue, however, that such a constricted vision, of the range, and 
capability, of intellectual pursuit, as is implicit in the above remarks, may be 
unnecessary. A constructive interpretation of formal non-algorithmic truth may, indeed, 
be able to introduce effective methods of verifiability into Tarski’s definitions , and to 
extend Church’s Thesis, so that such verifiability follows from the language itself, and is 
independent of any interpretation. 
Such a language could, then, be defined as effectively, if not uniformly, complete. 
5.5  Significance of formal truth 
Now, the significance of formal truths lies in our experience that the individual factual 
truths of our perceptions can generally be corresponded in a communicable language with 
a high degree of correlation to the formal truths of the language.  
This appears to suggest that the evolutionary significance to us (and possibly to any 
intelligence whose evolution is based on communication) of any set of individual factual 
truths may be proportional to the body of formal truths that can be constructed by various 
logical combinations and permutations of the axiomatic truths that we collectively accept 
as representative of some of our individual factual truths. 
5.6  Non-verifiable interpretations of Gödel’s formal system  
The significance of Gödel's Theorems lies in the fact that they are derived in a system of 
Axioms where the Rules of Inference lead to a particularly rich body of expressions that 
can be assigned formal truth-values under various interpretations of the symbols of the 
theory. However, a major feature of such a system is that it also lends itself to 
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interpretations of the chosen Rules of Inference that are non-constructive, in the sense 
that they are able to assign, implicitly and sweepingly, non-verifiable formal truth-values 
in some models to various expressions. Thus the language, in a sense, admits formally 
true expressions under some interpretations that cannot be correlated, even in principle, to 
any factual truths of a human perception. 
However, this is not necessarily the drawback that it appears to be at first sight. In fact 
such duality should both encourage and discipline us in our use of rich and creative 
languages that can be used, both, as languages for the mathematical expression of some 
of our mental concepts, and as languages of effective communication for some of our 
mental concepts. This should, moreover, force us to focus on devising criteria by which 
we can recognise vague, or ill-defined, concepts that, although expressible 
mathematically, cannot be effectively communicated by, and hence cannot be introduced 
as primitive symbols of (or defined in terms of existing primitive symbols of), a formal 
language.  
II-6 Can a constructive interpretation of Peano Arithmetic model 
some of the more paradoxical concepts of Quantum Mechanics? 
Interestingly, insistence on a constructive verifiability of Tarski’s definitions  of the 
satisfiability and truth of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation, as 
suggested in this essay, implies that PA can also express relations that are deterministic, 
yet essentially unpredictable; such a language would have significance for the expression 
of natural phenomena that are best described in quantum mechanical terms. 
Thus, in Anand [An03i], we indicate how the introduction of constructive definitions of 
classical mathematical concepts permits formal systems of Peano Arithmetic to model 
some of the more paradoxical concepts of Quantum Mechanics. For instance, as a 
consequence of §I-6(xiii), consider the following argument:  
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(a) Gödel has proved, in his 1931 paper [G031a], that there is an arithmetic formula 
[R(x)] such that, for any given k, [R(k)] is provable.  
(b) Hence, for any given k, there is always some effective method for evaluating the 
arithmetic expression R(k) (when treated as a Boolean function). 
(c) Gödel has also proved in the above paper that [(Ax)R(x)] is not provable. 
(d) Thesis: There is no uniformly effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) that 
can evaluate the arithmetic expression R(x) for any given x. 
(e) Thus, R(n) is individually computable, but not uniformly computable. 
(f) Theorem (provable by induction): For any given k, we can always find some 
effective method (algorithm/Turing machine)  T(k) that can compute R(n) for all n<k, 
i.e. T(k) terminates for all n<k, but it “loops” on input k. (Note: All methods that 
evaluate R(n) for all n<k cannot be non-terminating on input k; this would imply that 
R(k) is undefined, which would contradict (b).) 
(g) Quantum interpretation: The process of finding T(k+1) can be corresponded, 
first, to the act of finding a suitable method of measuring the value R(k) precisely, 
and, second, to the collapse of the wave function at k as a result of the 
measurement; we then have the new “state” T(k'), which can evaluate the value of 
R(n) for all n<k', where k<k', but not beyond! 
(h) If, now, we have some law that determines the state T(k') from the state T(k) and 
the interaction at k, we have a deterministic interaction that is, nevertheless, 
absolutely unpredictable, where we may then define free will as absolute 
unpredictability. (We note that, if k' > k+1, we have a language that admits inter -
actions that can leave the state T(k') unchanged.) 
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Now we note that a counter-thesis to (d) would be: 
(i) Counter-Thesis: There is some uniformly effective method (algorithm/Turing 
machine) that can evaluate the arithmetic expression R(x) for any given x. 
It follows from Gödel’s reasoning in [Go31a] that both (d) and (i) are effectively 
unverifiable, since they cannot be proved formally. We thus have two standard models of 
Peano Arithmetic - classical and constructive - that are mutually inconsistent. If we 
assume that both are consistent, the above argument indicates the interpretation that 
implies (d) may be the more suitable language for expressing, and effectively 
communicating, some of the more paradoxical concepts of classical Quantum Theory. 
III In conclusion 
In this essay, we have argued that classical interpretations of Gödel’s, Tarski’s, Turing’s 
and Cantor’s formal reasoning, and of their conclusions, implicitly imply that 
mathematical languages are essentially incomplete, in the sense that the truth of some 
arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, 
is, both, non-algorithmic, and essentially unverifiable.  
We have argued, however, that a language of general, scientific, disco urse, which intends 
to mathematically express, and unambiguously communicate, intuitive concepts that 
correspond to scientific views of the universe, cannot allow its mathematical propositions 
to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical 
truth verifiably.  
We have considered a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of 
Gödel’s reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic - classically 
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accepted as the foundation of all our mathematical languages - is verifiably complete in 
the above sense.  
We have, further, indicated how some of the more contentious foundational issues 
regarding the nature of mathematical objects and mathematical truth, and  some seemingly 
paradoxical mathematical concepts - such as that of Gödel’s undecidable proposition, that 
of Turing’s uncomputable Halting function, and that of a probabilistic, yet deterministic, 
Quantum mechanics - can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive 
definition of mathematical truth. 
We have, thus, argued that there are no absolute limits on our capacity to express human 
cognition unambiguously in a communicable language; there are only temporal limits - 
not necessarily absolute - to the capacity of classical interpretations to communicate 
unambiguously that which we intended to capture within our formal expression. 
Appendix 
1.  Notation 
Unless specified otherwise, we generally follow the notation introduced by Mendelson in 
his English translation of Gödel’s 1931 paper [Go31a]; however, for convenience of 
exposition, we refer to it as Gödel’s notation. Two notable exceptions: we use the 
notation “(Ax)”, whose classical, standard, interpretation is “for all x”, to denote Gödel’s 
special symbol for Generalisation; the successor symbol is denoted by “S”, instead of by 
“f”. 
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Following Gödel (cf. [Go31a], footnote 13), we use square brackets to indicate that the 
expression [(Ax)], including square brackets, only denotes the uninterpreted string88 
named89 within the brackets. Thus, [(Ax)] is not part of the formal system P, and would 
be replaced by Gödel’s special symbolism for Generalisation wherever it occurs. 
Following Gödel’s definitions of well-formed formulas90, we note that juxtaposing the 
string [(Ax)] and the formula91 [F(x)] is the formula [(Ax)F(x)], juxtaposing the symbol 
[~] and the formula [F] is the formula [~F], and juxtaposing the symbol [v] between the 
formulas [F] and [G] is the formula [FvG]. 
The number-theoretic functions and relations are defined explicitly by Gödel92 [Go31a]. 
The formulas are defined implicitly by his reasoning.  
2.  Some of Gödel’s definitions 
For convenience, we reproduce some of the more significant of Gödel’s definitions. We 
take P to be Gödel’s formal system93, and define ([Go31a], Theorem VI, p24-25): 
                                               
88 We define a “string” as any concatenation of a finite set of the primitive symbols of the formal system 
under consideration. 
 
89 We note that the “name” inside the square brackets only serves as an abbreviation for some string in P.  
 
90 We note that all well-formed formulas of P are strings of P, but all strings of P are not well-formed 
formulas of P. 
 
91 By “formula”, we shall henceforth mean a “well-formed formula” as defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p11). 
 
92 We follow Gödel’s definition of recursive number-theoretic functions and relations ([Go31a], p14-17). 
We note, in particular, that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic function Sb(x 19|Z(y)) is defined as the 
Gödel-number of the P-formula that is obtained from the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x by 
substituting the numeral [y], whose Gödel-number is Z(y), for the variable whose Gödel-number is 19 
wherever the latter occurs free in the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x ([Go31a], p20, def.31). We also 
note that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic relation xBy holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a 
proof sequence for the P-formula whose Gödel-number is y ([Go31a], p22, def. 45). 
 
93 Gödel ([Go31a], p9-13). 
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(i) Q(x, y) as Gödel’s recursive number-theoretical relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))). 
(ii) [R(x, y)] as a formula that represents Q(x, y) in the formal system P. 
(iii) q as the Gödel-number94 of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
(iv) p as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, y)]95 of P. 
(v) [p] as the numeral that represents the natural number p in P. 
(vi) r as the Gödel-number of the formula [R(x, p)] of P. 
(vii) 17Genr as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
(viii) Neg(17Genr)96 as the Gödel-number of the formula [~(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
(ix) R(x, y) as the standard interpretation of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
(x) Wid(P) as the number-theoretic assertion (Ex)(Form(x) & ~Bew(x))97. 
(We note that Wid(P) is defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p36) as equivalent to the 
meta-assertion “P is consistent”.) 
(xi) [Con(P)] as the formula that represents Wid(P) in the formal system P. 
                                               
94 By the “Gödel-number” of a formula of P, we mean the natural number corresponding to the formula in 
the 1-1 correspondence defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p13). 
 
95 We note that “[(Ax)][R(x, y)]” and “[(Ax)R(x, y)]” denote the same formula of P. 
 
96 We note that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic function Neg(x) is the Gödel-number of the P-formula 
that is the negation of the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x ([Go31a], p18, def. 13). 
 
97 We note that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic relation Form(x) is satisfied if, and only if, x is the 
Gödel-number of a P-formula ([Go31a], p19, def. 23). Also, Gödel’s number-theoretic relation Bew(x) is 
satisfied if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a provable P-formula ([Go31a], p22, def. 46). 
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(xii) w as the Gödel-number of the formula [Con(P)] of P [1, p37]. 
(xiii) Con(P) as the standard interpretation of the formula [Con(P)] of P. 
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